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CORPORATE SHORT-TERMISM AND 
INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 
ROBERT J. RHEE* 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents an intertemporal model of short-termism. Critics 
have portrayed short-termism in broad brushstrokes as the bane of 
corporate governance. But short-termism does not have a self-evident, 
efficiency-based normative value. A simple application of a well-accepted 
asset valuation theory shows that short-termism is not per se inefficient. If 
profitable enough, a short-term strategy would be better than a long-term 
strategy. This intuition is a mathematical and financial fact. The model 
presented here is tested in a case study of Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. 
v. Airgas, Inc., a prominent and legally significant Delaware hostile 
takeover battle. Short-termism was a key fact in the court’s legal analysis 
of the target’s poison pill defense. The case enables a counterfactual 
analysis of the financial returns based on the target’s intertemporal 
strategic choices and the time horizons of shareholders. The choice of a 
short-term strategy is contextual; the outcomes therefrom can result in 
random errors or rational outcomes. It can also result in a systemic social 
problem, but only when two levels of market inefficiency coexist: the 
corporate market is systemically biased in intertemporal decisions, and the 
capital market is inefficient in failing to incorporate this bias into stock 
prices. These conditions are special, occurring only infrequently. They are 
intrinsic qualities of a market bubble.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The concern over corporate short-termism has been long expressed. 1 
Short-termism is the idea that managers myopically focus on short-term 
results at the cost of long-term profitability and firm value. Recent debate 
over short-termism expresses the concern that, given the heterogeneity of 
shareholder investment time horizons, activist short-term shareholders—
archetypically hedge funds—pressure managers to adopt strategies that 
increase short-term share price at some cost to the firm’s long-term profit 
or prospect.2 The debate is important on several levels. At the level of theory, 
it informs the fundamental allocation of power between managers and 
shareholders.3 At the level of corporate governance, it informs directors and 
                                                                                                               
1. Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The 
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 202–15 (1991); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover 
Threats and Management Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61 (1988); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the 
Target’s Boardroom, 33 BUS. LAW. 101, 104 (1979).  
2. See infra Section I.A.  
3. MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003); Air Prods. & Chems., 













officers of the broad directive to create value.4 At the level of policy, it 
informs whether corporation law or other laws should be used to remedy a 
perceived social problem or market inefficiency.5  
If short-termism exists in the market and diminishes the value of firms, 
it undermines the idea that greater shareholder power and activism leads to 
wealth maximization. Some have argued that activist short-term 
shareholders do not create value, and they instead extract rent resulting in 
net social cost in the form of lower firm values over the long-term.6 This 
argument strikes at the heart of a strong shareholder-centric paradigm and 
the legitimacy of increasing activism by shareholders with shorter 
investment horizons such as hedge funds.7 
Academic attention on short-termism has been legion. 8  Engaging in 
theoretical and empirical analyses, commentators have sharply disagreed on 
the hypothesis of short-termism.9 The perception that short-termism is a 
problem has influenced elite levels of the corporate community, business 
courts, and policymakers.10 The academic debate has a direct connection to 
the levers of policy.  
                                                                                                               
4. See infra Section I.B. (describing the comments of some Delaware judges and courts).  
5. See infra notes 247–248 (providing various proposals for dealing with perceived short-
termism).  
6. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question: Can Corporations Be 
Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 
BUS. LAW. 1, 8 (2010); Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds 
and the Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2016).  
7. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1087 (2007) (“Short-termism thus presents the potentially 
most important, most controversial, most ambiguous, and most complex problem associated with hedge 
fund activism.”). 
8. E.g., David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting and 
the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. LAW. 295 (2017); J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 
72 BUS. LAW. 353 (2017); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood 
Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 116 YALE L.J. 
1870 (2017); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016); Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for 
Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554 (2015); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei 
Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015); Robert 
Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 19 (2015); Mark 
J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 977 (2013); 
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008).  
9. See infra Section I.A.  
10. See Roe, supra note 8, at 982 & n.13 (noting comments of commissioners of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC)); infra Section I.B. (discussing the viewpoints of Delaware judges); 
ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO 
INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT (Sept. 9, 2009) (signatories include prominent business 
leaders John Bogle, Warren Buffett, and Louis Gerston); Joe Biden, How Short-Termism Saps the 
Economy, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-short-termism-saps-the-eco 
 










This paper contributes a theoretical model of short-termism. The thesis 
is simple: when a firm faces an intertemporal choice of profit tradeoff, the 
choice of the short-term profit is not per se inefficient. This idea is 
empirically testable against the facts of one of the most prominent hostile 
takeover cases in recent years. Based on this analysis of theory and case 
study, this paper presents a framework for understanding how short-termism 
can be benign, beneficial, or harmful.11 These ideas are organized into four 
sections.  
Section I briefly summarizes the academic and judicial literature on the 
hypothesis of short-termism. Commentators sharply disagree on theory and 
empirical evidence. They sometimes use or confuse subtle but different 
definitions and conceptions of short-termism. These differences are 
significant. Ambiguity in the conversation hinders understanding; precise 
definitions and concepts advance it. This paper proposes three distinct forms 
short-termism. Each form requires a specific analysis.  
Section II constructs an intertemporal model of short-termism. The core 
scenario in the debate concerns managerial choice of intertemporal tradeoff 
of short-term profit and long-term cost. The model is based on a theory of 
asset valuation that is well-accepted by the financial community and 
Delaware courts. It confirms as a matter of mathematical and financial truth 
the intuition that, if profitable enough, a short-term strategy can be rational 
and maximize firm value. The model shows that short-term choices can 
frequently be the optimal strategy.  
Section III applies the model in an empirical case study of Air Products 
& Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.12 The case provides an ideal set of facts to 
test the model and its idea. Unique events permit a counterfactual analysis 
of the target’s intertemporal choices in a legal context where the short-term 
time horizon of shareholders was the most important factor in the court’s 
                                                                                                               
nomy-1475018087 (commenting that short-termism “is one of the greatest threats to America’s enduring 
prosperity”).  
11. As a prefatory matter, the scope of this paper is limited to a sustained study of short-term 
corporate actions. This paper’s primary contribution is the idea that neither long-term nor short-term 
corporate actions and strategies have a self-evident, efficiency-based normative value as demonstrated 
through a financial model of intertemporal choice at the microeconomic level of managerial decision-
making. This paper is not a general study of shareholder activism, which is a broad subject. It discusses 
shareholder activism and hedge funds in the specific context of the short-termism debate. See Coffee & 
Palia, supra note 8, at 573 (“One of the most frequently voiced concerns about hedge fund activism is 
that it will lead to ‘short-termism’ . . . .”); Bernard S. Sharfman, Activist Hedge Funds in a World of 
Board Independence: Creators or Destroyers of Long-Term Value?, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 813, 
816 (2015) (same). The debate on short-termism is had in various areas of public policy. See, e.g., Ian 
Bremmer, How the Financial Crisis Undermined America’s Place Atop the Global Order, TIME (Sept. 
20, 2018) (“And Americans still invest for short-term gain rather than long-term productivity. That’s 
why the stock market is rising while infrastructure crumbles.”). The paper should not be construed as a 
contextless, general endorsement of short-termism.  
12. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011); Airgas, Inc. v. Air 












analysis of the target’s poison pill. This case study confirms that, given a 
specific condition, the short-term strategy can be more profitable. It shows 
that the intertemporal model has explanatory power in understanding board 
decisions and judicial analyses.  
Section IV analyzes the conditions in which short-termism is benign, 
beneficial, and harmful. The form of short-termism and its systematicity 
determine whether it can be a social problem. Short-term shareholders, such 
as hedge funds, can play a beneficial role. By providing a liquidity of 
concentrated ownership, they push the traditional, historical structure of 
diffuse ownership in United States (U.S.) public corporations toward the 
structure of concentrated ownership commonly seen in other parts of the 
world, though the U.S. form of such ownership is transient and transactional.  
I. THE PROBLEM OF SHORT-TERMISM 
In the new century, U.S. companies have continued to experience three 
interrelated phenomena: increasing institutional ownership, 13  shortening 
hold periods,14 and increasing shareholder activism.15 The idea of short-
termism connects these trends to hypothesize that some activist 
shareholders with short-term holding periods as an investment strategy—
archetypically hedge funds 16 —pressure managers to select suboptimal 
corporate strategies and actions that increase short-term profit by sacrificing 
the firm’s long-term prospects. Among other pressure tactics, they coerce 
management through publicity campaigns and proxy contests.17 Strategies 
and actions advocated through such coercion include an array of financial 
decisions, strategic choices, and governance changes: for example, changes 
in policies on distributions such as dividends and stock buybacks, 
divestitures, mergers and acquisitions (M&A), asset allocation, capital 
                                                                                                               
13. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864–65 (2013) (showing 
that institutional shareholding increased from 6.1% of U.S. equities in 1950 to 50.6% and 73% of the 
1,000 largest U.S. corporations in 2009).  
14. See infra notes 164–166 and accompanying text; Berger, Solomon & Benjamin, supra note 
8, at 298–99. 
15. See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 
1392 n.72 (2017) (providing data on shareholder activists); Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 
1100 (same). See also Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 553–72 (explaining the factors spurring activism 
by hedge funds).  
16. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 573–74.  
17. Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1029; Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 6, at 271–72, 
312. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 148 (1990) (arguing that short-term investment horizons of 
arbitrageurs influence the time horizon of managers).  
 










expenditures, research and development (R&D), internal governance 
matters such as takeover defenses, and leadership changes in the board and 
senior management.18  
A. Academic Debate 
Scholars have vigorously disputed the hypothesis of short-termism. 
Proponents of the hypothesis have argued that short-termism exists, is a 
serious problem, and must be fixed through policy.19 They are suspicious of 
short-term shareholders and question whether the abnormal returns reflect 
“value actually created” or value “merely appropriated from fellow 
stockholders with longer-term investment horizons.” 20  Disunity of 
shareholders’ interests is possible because markets are imperfect, resulting 
in increased short-term stock price even when long-term value has been 
diminished, and because shareholders have heterogeneous preferences in 
terms of risk and time horizon. 21 A myopic, short-term perspective has 
broad social implications because it has been a causal factor in past major 
crises in the corporate and financial markets.22 Thus, short-termism not only 
adversely affects companies and long-term shareholders, but also the 
broader society.  
Opponents of the hypothesis have argued that short-termism is an 
incoherent idea.23 One argument is that as a matter of finance theory, short-
termism cannot exist in informationally rich, liquid capital markets.24 Short-
                                                                                                               
18. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 29; Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 550, 573; Bebchuk, Brav 
& Jiang, supra note 8, at 1093; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund 
Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1741–45 (2008).  
19. See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Commitment and 
Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 747–51 (2016); Strine, supra note 8, 
at 1873; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 202–15; Jack Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware 
Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1657 (2011).  
20. Martin Lipton, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, Important Questions About Activists Hedge 
Funds, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2013), https://corpgov.law.har 
vard.edu/2013/03/09/important-questions-about-activist-hedge-funds. 
21. See Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 6, at 276–79.  
22. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 265, 268 n.7, 269 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 673 (2006); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (2002); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Why Excessive Risk-Taking 
Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/ 
dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine; Martin Lipton, Theodore N. Mirvis & Jay W. Lorsch, The Proposed 
“Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009”, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (May 
12 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/05/12/the-proposed-shareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of-2 
009.  
23. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8; Anderson, supra note 8.  
24. See infra notes 65 and 235; Heaton, supra note 8, at 359 (“[F]inancial economists, as a rule, 













term shareholders can profit at the expense of long-term shareholders only 
if the stock market has a systematic bias; the market must undervalue long-
term profit relative to short-term profit. If information on profitability is 
correctly incorporated into stock price, all shareholders are in the same 
position. There is a unity of shareholders’ interests because their profit, 
short-term or long-term, inures to the benefit of all shareholders.25  
Other skeptics have argued that short-termism is consistent with firm 
value maximization26 or that no policy redress is needed in light of already 
existing corrective mechanisms in the market.27 Some have also suggested 
that proponents of the hypothesis have a hidden agenda: that is, a belief that 
short-termism tends to increase shareholder profit at the cost of long-term 
stakeholder interest and an objection thereto.28 This objective, opponents 
argue, is really just another iteration of the long-continuing debate on 
shareholder primacy. 29  Evidence of this contention is seen in the ALI 
Principles of Corporate Governance, which explicitly justifies a preference 
for long-term profit on the ground that long-term profitability promotes the 
interest of all stakeholders.30  
Empirical studies have tried to test the short-termism hypothesis. These 
studies have focused on stock price returns before and after activist 
intervention to determine whether it results in a pump-and-dump stock price 
manipulation. A recent paper studied stock price movement during a five-
year period following activist intervention. 31  It found that the public 
disclosure of activist intervention resulted in an average abnormal positive 
                                                                                                               
inconsistent with basic principles of mainstream financial economics.”); George W. Dent, Jr., The 
Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 100 
(2010) (“Most experts in corporate law and in financial economics believe that most shareholders have 
the same investment goal . . . .”).  
25. Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1084.  
26. Fried, supra note 8, at 1561–64, 1574; Bernard S. Sharfman, The Tension Between Hedge 
Fund Activism and Corporate Law, 12 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 251 (2016). 
27. Roe, supra note 8, at 1005–06; Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1989.  
28. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 53–62; Heaton, supra note 8, at 357; Roe, supra note 8, at 
1004; Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment Theory: Implication 
for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 142 (1991). 
29. See generally Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of Shareholder Primacy, 108 MINN. L. REV. 
1951 (2018).  
30. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.01 cmt. f (1994) (“Short-term profits may properly be subordinated to recognition that responsible 
maintenance of these interdependencies [among employees, customers, suppliers, and members of the 
communities] is likely to contribute to long-term corporate profit and shareholder gain.”). Cf. William 
T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 272–
73 (1992) (corporate law “papered over” the debate on shareholder primacy “by invoking a murky 
distinction between long-term profit maximization and short-term profit maximization”). 
31. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 1089.  
 










return, and after shareholder intervention it found operational gains and no 
abnormal negative stock returns.32 Some scholars have criticized this study 
and argued that the abnormal returns reported are attributable to successful 
stock picking instead of value added by activism.33 They have presented 
other empirical evidence supporting the argument that short-term 
shareholder activism does not mitigate managerial agency cost. 34  Other 
scholars have suggested that indirect empirical evidence, such as the use of 
dual class stock and earnings manipulations, supports the contention that 
markets have focused on short-term results.35 Some commentators have 
argued that the entire empirical enterprise is inherently limited because such 
studies cannot explain causality.36 In sum, empirical analyses thus far have 
been inconclusive.37  
B. Delaware Judges and Courts 
Delaware judges have also weighed in. In scholarly writings, some have 
endorsed the idea that corporations should be managed for the long-term 
and have disapproved of short-termism. 38  Jack Jacobs has called short-
termism “a national problem that needs to be fixed.” 39  Leo Strine has 
warned against “the emergence of activist hedge funds as a powerful force 
acting upon public companies.”40 The corporate governance system should 
favor the long-term perspective and the adoption of sustainable strategies to 
                                                                                                               
32. Id. at 1117, 1122, 1130–31, 1134.  
33. Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 6, at 280–85; Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 586.  
34. Id. at 285–304. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic 
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 462–63, 
463 n.41 (2014).  
35. Roe, supra note 8, at 980, 986; Berger, Solomon & Benjamin, supra note 8, at 303.  
36. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jonathan R. Macey, Robert T. Miller & Steven A. Rosenblum, 
Corporations: The Short-Termism Debate, 85 MISS. L.J. 697, 708 (2016) (comment of Steven 
Rosenblum) (hereinafter “The Short-Termism Debate”). Cf. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 8, at 1301 
(“[T]he temporary nature of the price increase will become apparent only after some time, and then any 
decline could be attributed to other causes.”). 
37. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory of Corporate Law and 
Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 821 (2017) (“produced mixed results”); Emiliano M. Catan & 
Marcel Kahan, The Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629, 665–67 (2016) 
(“yielded little knowledge”); Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 1085 & n.271 (“sketchy at best”); Coffee 
& Palia, supra note 8, at 551 (“decidedly more mixed”). See also Sharfman, supra note 11, at 819 (noting 
that some prominent corporate law commentators have rejected empirical studies supporting hedge fund 
activism).  
38. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can 
Corporations Be Managed for the Long-Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think 
Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 7–9 (2010); Jacobs, supra note 19, at 1652, 1661–63; William T. Allen, 
Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the 
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1096 (2002).  
39. Jacobs, supra note 19, at 1657.  













do business. 41  These judges are wary of increased power of short-term 
shareholders to influence policy in corporate governance beyond the 
traditional framework of the corporate franchise.42  
These scholarly statements are consistent with the judicial refrain that 
the board should manage the business and affairs of the corporation for the 
“long-term” interest of the shareholders and the corporation.43 Presumably, 
the long-term equates to the animating goal of maximizing firm value.44 But 
the “long-run” has also been said to be an elision to harmonize conflicting 
models of corporate nature and purpose.45 When courts refer to the “long-
term,” it may be code for managerial authority encompassing the 
consideration of the interests of all stakeholders.46  
A problem with the “long-run” refrain is that courts do not define what 
the long-term is in instrumental terms that translate to specific corporate 
actions.47 It presumably means perpetuity.48 But in truth courts cannot guide 
managers toward selection of time horizons. The judicial prescription thus 
must be taken with a grain of salt. Delaware courts have been more 
equivocal when cases require a specific analysis of intertemporal choice, 
though ultimately their thumb is firmly on the scale of managerial 
prerogative and authority as long as certain fiduciary conditions are met.  
                                                                                                               
41. Strine has argued that corporations should “make money the old-fashioned way, by 
implementing sustainable strategies to sell products and services and not through edgy practices, 
accounting gimmickry, or never-ending cycles of spin-offs and mergers.” Id. at 1874. 
42. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the 
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. 
CORP. L. 1, 7 (2007); Jacobs, supra note 19, at 1652; E. Norman Veasey, The Stockholder Franchise Is 
Not a Myth: A Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811, 815–16 (2007).  
43. E.g., Virtus Capital L.P. v. Eastman Chem. Co., C.A. No. 9808-VCL, 2015 WL 580553, at 
*16 n.5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2015) (“maximize the corporation’s value over the long-term”); In re Rural 
Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“maximize value over the long-term”); Gantler v. Stephens, 
965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (“enhancing the corporation’s long term share value”); Credit Lyonnais 
Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 30, 1991) (“maximize the corporation’s long-term wealth”); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition 
Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“long run interests 
of shareholders”); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“maximize the long-run 
interests of the corporation’s stockholders”).  
44. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations 
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012) (“[C]orporate law requires directors, as a matter 
of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits . . . .”). 
45. Allen, supra note 30, at 273.  
46. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.  
47. See Heaton, supra note 8, at 360 (“But what is this ‘long-term’ shareholder value? The courts 
never say. It is not a concept from financial economics. Does anyone have a coherent explanation for 
what it means, in economic terms?”). 
48. See infra note 79.  
 










Shareholders and managers often conflict in intertemporal choices in the 
takeover context.49 Shareholders often desire a short-term cash out, and 
managers often prefer a long-term strategy.50 The leading case addressing 
the issue of time horizon is Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. 
The Delaware Supreme Court there analyzed whether the Time board 
breached its fiduciary duty when it rejected Paramount’s takeover offer in 
favor of acquiring Warner as a part of its long-term corporate strategy to 
remain independent.51 The court framed the issue of time horizon as this: 
“Did Time’s board, having developed a [long-term] strategic plan . . . come 
under a fiduciary duty to jettison its plan and put the corporation’s future in 
the hands of its stockholders?”52 The court answered no: “Directors are not 
obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term 
shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate 
strategy.”53 On the specific issue of intertemporal choice, it is “unwise to 
place undue emphasis upon long-term versus short-term corporate 
strategy.”54 The choice is a matter of managerial prerogative to select the 
time horizon in exercising business judgment.  
This broad mandate [to manage the corporation under DGCL § 
141(a)] includes a conferred authority to set a corporate course of 
action, including time frame, designed to enhance corporate 
profitability. Thus, the question of “long-term” versus “short-term” 
values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged 
to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without 
regard to a fixed investment horizon.55 
The court’s observation is correct. The lodestar of value maximization is 
not some specific timeframe. It is the strategy that maximizes the present 
value of all future free cashflow.56 Short-term profit maximization is the 
legally required strategy only when a firm is in the Revlon zone;57 then the 
                                                                                                               
49. See Allen, supra note 30, at 275 (“The long-term/short-term distinction could not 
persuasively be used to answer or evade that question when it arose in [the takeover] context.”).  
50. See Lipton, supra note 1, at 104.  
51. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  
52. Id. at 1149–50.  
53. Id. at 1154. 
54. Id. at 1150.  
55. Id. “Indeed, in our view, precepts underlying the business judgment rule militate against a 
court’s engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-term 
versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders.” Id. at 1153.  
56. See infra Section II.A. See also Sharfman, supra note 11, at 837 (“Long-term value creation 
means a decision-making process where management strives to maximize a firm’s net present value.”).  
57. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). See 
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“Thus, the question of ‘long-













board’s substantive action is legally cabined to the short-term because “for 
the present shareholders, there is no long run.”58 Otherwise, the court does 
not require a specific time horizon despite the oft-repeated “long-term” 
leitmotif in judicial commentary.59  
C. Forms of Short-Termism  
Short-termism as an idea is the excessive focus on short-term goals at the 
expense of longer-term goals resulting in insufficient attention to long-term 
strategy and value.60 When applied to corporate governance and managerial 
decision-making, the idea lacks concreteness. 61  The concept has been 
elusive. Scholars have assumed or conflated different and consequential 
definitions of short-termism, which can be confusing. Unless these 
definitional differences are explicitly teased out, we gloss over important 
facets of the short-termism debate.  
Commentary at times employ two conceptions of how short-termism 
works. Short-termism has sometimes been defined in terms of increasing 
stock price at the expense of long-term firm value.62 At other times, it has 
been defined in terms of increasing short-term profit at the expense of long-
term firm value.63 Price and profit can be coterminous, but they are not the 
same. In a semi-strong efficient market, they can be used interchangeably 
without much problem because information related to profits is incorporated 
into the market price.64 Any disclosed current action that harms the firm’s 
                                                                                                               
course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed investment horizon. 
Second, absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon, a board of directors, while always 
required to act in an informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the 
short term, even in the context of a takeover.”).  
58. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Civ. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 202290, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). 
59. “The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame 
for achievement of corporate goals.” Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 
(Del. 1989). See Sharfman, supra note 11, at 833 (“Thus, the meaning of ‘long-term’ cannot be 
characterized by being greater than any specific number of days, months, or years. It simply depends on 
the situation.”).  
60. See BARTOSZ OLESIŃSKI ET AL., EY POLAND, SHORT-TERMISM IN BUSINESS: CAUSES, 
MECHANISMS AND CONSEQUENCES 7 (2014).  
61. Berger, Solomon & Benjamin, supra note 8, at 299–300; Kahan & Rock, supra note 7, at 
1087.  
62. Fried, supra note 8, at 1557–58, 1580–81; Anderson, supra note 8, at 30; Strine, supra note 
34, at 477.  
63. Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 541, 559 (2016).  
64. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970). See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565–92 (1984).  
 










long-term prospect will be incorporated into the stock price; such disclosure 
makes short-termism impossible because it would diminish current stock 
price, defeating the whole purpose of increasing stock price through short-
term action. In an efficient market, short-termism cannot exist. The short-
termism hypothesis must assume that markets are inefficient. 65  In an 
inefficient market, profit and price are not coterminous.66 The difference 
between profit and stock price implies three forms of short-termism.  
The first form, termed the “tradeoff form” here, is the concept that 
managers increase short-term profit by sacrificing long-term profit.67 For 
example, a company does not make investments in the short-term that could 
yield long-term profit. If this strategy increases short-term profit, the 
correctness of the strategy is subject to a standard cost-benefit analysis. 
Well-accepted theoretical and practical tools in finance can answer that 
question. When a manager correctly executes a tradeoff strategy, a conflict 
between a short-term and a long-term shareholder cannot exist.  
The second form of short-termism is premised on the concept that 
managers inflate stock price through tactics that generate no real profit in 
the short-term.68 It is a pump-and-dump stock scheme at best, and a form of 
fraud at worst.69 Managers somehow fool the market into believing that the 
short-term action creates value, but firm value is either unaffected or suffers 
when the market ultimately learns the truth. The inflation form of short-
termism has two variants. The “inflation no loss form” is stock price 
inflation in the short-term without harm to long-term profit. Intrinsic firm 
value is ultimately unaffected. The “inflation loss form” is stock price 
                                                                                                               
65. See supra note 23; infra note 235; Heaton, supra note 8, at 359 (“It assumes a level of investor 
irrationality that the facts cannot bear.”); Anderson, supra note 8, at 33 (“In order for short-term prices 
to differ in predictable ways from long-term prices, the capital markets must be inefficient.”); Bebchuk, 
Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 1096 (“Supporters of the myopic-activists claim believe that stock market 
prices are sometimes informationally inefficient . . . .”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating 
Boards Serve Long-Term Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1660–76 (2013) (same).  
66. See Fried, supra note 8, at 1583 n.105 (“If markets are rational, then short-term shareholders 
cannot systematically benefit from costly price-boosting manipulation. . . . If markets are noisy rather 
than rational . . . short-term shareholders can benefit both ex post and ex ante from costly price-boosting 
manipulation.”).  
67. “Profit” broadly means real economic gain, which ultimately results in free cash flow 
available to stockholders in a financial analysis. See infra note 72.  
68. See Berger, Solomon & Benjamin, supra note 8, at 300 (referencing inflation of stock price); 
Anderson, supra note 8, at 37 (same); Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 8, at 170 (same).  
69. See Fried, supra note 8, at 1581 (describing earnings manipulation and other misleading 
tactics); Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 549 (noting that critics have charged hedge funds with “pump 
and dump” schemes); Bill George, Activists Seek Short-Term Gain, Not Long-Term Value, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/activists-seek-short-term-gain-
not-long-term-value (“They lobby publicly for significant structural changes, hoping to drive up the 














inflation in the short-term with real harm to long-term profit.70 Since long-
term profit has been sacrificed with no concomitant offset in short-term 
profit, managerial action diminishes intrinsic firm value. Like the tradeoff 
form of short-termism, the inflation form presents its own analytical and 
policy considerations.  
The three forms of short-termism, often conflated in conversation, are 
conceptually consequential. Because short-termism is an ambiguous 
concept, we should specify its precise mechanisms. The above three forms 
of short-termism inform the analysis in this article. 
II. INTERTEMPORAL MODEL OF PROFIT TRADEOFF 
Of the three forms of short-termism, the tradeoff form should be the least 
contestable analysis—at least if fundamental finance principles are not 
disputed. Short-termism is sometimes characterized in broad brush strokes 
as the bane of corporate governance, creating a misleading impression that 
elevates long-term strategies as aspirational and short-term choices as 
suboptimal. Such characterization is too simplistic and misleading, frankly, 
at the microeconomic level to describe the range of strategies managers 
must select. Managers routinely make intertemporal cost-benefit choices.71 
We can model the cost-benefit of these choices by applying a generally 
accepted financial theory of asset valuation.  
A. Primer on Asset Valuation  
At the most abstract level, the theoretical value of a firm is the expected 
cashflow that a firm provides investors discounted by a rate reflecting the 
riskiness of the cashflow, and so the expectation of return is commensurate 
with the risk taken.72 When investors purchase a security, they give the firm 
cash in the present and expect the firm to pay cash in the future. The firm 
should provide a return sufficient to entice investors to contribute capital in 
light of the fact that they have other investment opportunities, such as risk-
free securities and a market-indexed portfolio.73  
                                                                                                               
70. See Fried, supra note 8, at 1581 (describing two situations, one where stock price 
manipulation is economically costless and another where it is costly).  
71. See TIM KOLLER, MARC GOEDHART & DAVID WESSELS, VALUATION: MEASURING AND 
MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 13 (6th ed. 2015) (noting the tradeoffs managers make between 
short-term profit and long-term value).  
72. Id. at 17; RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 94 (11th ed. 2014).  
73. See ROBERT J. RHEE, CORPORATE FINANCE 61–73 (2016) (explaining the concept of cost of 
capital and investment returns).  
 










This theory is applied in the practice of finance. In securities analysis, 
the most prominent and generally accepted technique to calculate a firm’s 
theoretical value is the discounted cashflow (DCF) analysis. 74  This 
technique is founded on Nobel Prize-winning works in portfolio theory and 
capital asset pricing model.75 The DCF has long been accepted by Delaware 
courts. 76  The technique requires discounting free cashflow (hereinafter 
                                                                                                               
74. See Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 203 
(2007) (“generally accepted technique”); Ryan v. Tad’s Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(“well-established and accepted in the financial community”), aff’d, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1997); Neal v. 
Alabama By-Products Corp., Civ. A. No. 8282, 1990 WL 109243, at *7 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990) (“the 
preeminent valuation methodology”), aff’d, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“the single best technique to estimate 
the value of an economic asset”), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).  
75. Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset 
Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).  
76. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 651 (Del. 2014); Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712–13 (Del. 1983). Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court has signaled a 
preference for market-based valuation techniques, such as analyses of market prices and market 
multiples, over the DCF analysis in appraisal proceedings under DGCL § 262. See Dell v. Magnetar 
Global Master Fund, 177 A.3d 1, 35–38 (Del. 2017); DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 
L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 368–71 (Del. 2017). These decisions do not reject the economic theory underlying 
the DCF analysis. See DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 369 (suggesting that the same principles of economics 
and corporate finance underlie the market and theoretical value of stocks, which is the discounting of 
free cash flows to present value). It would be rather uninformed for business courts to reject the most 
prominent theory of asset value, supported by well-established academic literature and regularly applied 
by financial market professionals in the marketplace. Rather, these decisions must be read in the specific 
context of adversarial appraisal proceedings. They are best understood as skepticism of a single judge’s 
ability to engage in an objective valuation in the context of adversarial litigation. See DFC Global, 172 
A.3d at 369–70 (“Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques because, 
unlike, e.g., a single person’s discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill the collective 
judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information about a given company and the 
value of its shares.”). In the litigation context, courts have long confronted the disquieting fact that the 
DCF analysis can produce valuations that are oceans apart because financial models depend on the 
underlying assumptions and inputs, which often depend on subjective judgment of experts hired by 
litigating parties. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *1 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (noting that the “dynamics of litigation no doubt contribute to this distressingly wide 
difference” in valuations by experts using the DCF analysis). See also Dell, 177 A.3d at 35 (noting “the 
hazards that always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based 
on widely divergent partisan expert testimony”); id. at 38 (“DCF valuations involve many inputs—all 
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight 
differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps.”); RHEE, supra note 73, at 108 (“[Valuation] 
requires subjective judgment on many variables that materially affect the results. Valuations typically 
produce a range of values. Assumptions and subjective judgments matter.”). In the face of this problem, 
the court expressed greater confidence in the objective, if not infallible (see infra note 91), capital 
markets to determine asset values, i.e., a general starting presumption that the market is efficient if the 
asset is freely trading and values are readily seen. See DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 370 (suggesting that 
“you can trust prices, for they impound all available information about the value of each security”) 
(quoting RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 373 (2008)); Dell, 177 
A.3d at 24 (“Further, the Court of Chancery’s analysis ignored the efficient market hypothesis long 
endorsed by this Court. It teaches that the price produced by an efficient market is generally a more 
reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters 













“cashflow”) by a suitable discount rate.77 Cashflow is cash that is freely 
available to investors after payment of all expenditures.78 The typical DCF 
analysis assumes a going concern that operates in perpetuity.79 The discount 
rate is calculated as a suitable rate of return to investors that reflects the 
riskiness of the cashflow; the greater the risk, the more return an investor 
will demand and thus the more the cashflow is discounted by a greater 
discount rate.80 With perfect forecast of future cashflows discounted by the 
correct cost of capital, a DCF analysis should yield the precise intrinsic 
value of a firm. But perfect foresight is beyond human ability and 
ontological reality, and thus a perfectly competent analysis provides a best 
estimate of the firm’s theoretical value.81  
Since the economic value of any financial asset is the investor’s expected 
return discounted by a rate that compensates for the risk taken, the value of 
a firm can be expressed as:   
 







                                                                                                               
markets and market valuations is driven by the dynamics of litigation and rules of law applicable thereto. 
In essence, the decisions diminish the influence of the “battle of the experts” and the potential warping 
of an objective valuation.  
77. Rhee, supra note 74, at 202–03; RHEE, supra note 73, at 90–93. 
78. RHEE, supra note 73, at 91. 
79. Perpetual existence is the legal default rule. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(5) (2017) 
(noting that a certificate of incorporation may provide a provision “limiting the duration of the 
corporation’s existence to a specified date; otherwise, the corporation shall have perpetual existence”); 
In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“A Delaware corporation, by default, 
has a perpetual existence.”); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 552 (1819) (noting that 
the charter of Dartmouth College “create[d] such a corporation . . . to have perpetual existence”); 
Wicomico Cty. Comm’rs v. Bancroft, 203 U.S. 112, 115 (1906) (same). See also supra note 43 (citing 
Delaware cases expressing preference for “long-term” view); William T. Allen, Ambiguity in 
Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 896–97 (1997) (“[T]he proper orientation of corporation law 
is the protection of long-term value of capital committed indefinitely to the firm.”).  
80. RHEE, supra note 73, at 69–70, 92–93.  
81. Courts recognize the fallacies of subjective judgment and uncertainties associated with 
valuations. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at *1, *8 n.17 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (“radically different estimates of value” by experts conducting the same DCF 
analysis due to the “dynamics of litigation”), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996); Cede 
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) (“[I]t 
is one of the conceits of our law that we purport to declare something as elusive as the fair value of an 
entity on a given date.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005).  
 










where C is the cashflow, r the discount rate, and t time.82 For simplicity of 
expression, the discount factor (
1
(1+𝑟)𝑡
) is noted hereinafter simply as d.  
A DCF analysis values a firm’s cashflow for two discrete time periods: 
a forecast period for years 1 to n, and a terminal period for years (n + 1) to 
∞.83 The time n can be any selected future year. Since the credibility of a 
projection diminishes the further one forecasts into the future,84 a common 
choice for the forecast period is some period between 5 to 20 years.85 The 
terminal cashflow can be calculated in several ways, but a standard method 




Once the cashflow is forecasted and the time periods selected, the two 
cashflows from the forecast and the terminal periods are discounted at the 
rate r and the discount factor d.87 
 







Thus, the theoretical value of a firm under the DCF analysis is the total sum 
of the discounted cashflow attributable to investors, which is the sum of the 
present value of the cashflows of the two periods—the forecast period 
cashflow and the terminal cashflow.  
The application of asset pricing theory to the short-termism problem is 
clear. If we define the forecast period as the cashflow from the short-term 
and the terminal value as the cashflow from the long-term, the DCF analysis 
provides the economic framework for scrutinizing the short-termism 
                                                                                                               
82. The DCF methodology is textbook analysis. See RHEE, supra note 73, at 90–93; KOLLER, 
GOEDHART & WESSELS, supra note 71, at 31–33; BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 72, at 24, 93–
97; ASWATH DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 516 (4th ed. 2015); ASWATH DAMODARAN, 
INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET 11–
19 (3rd ed. 2012).  
83. See Rhee, supra note 74, at 202–03 (“Under the DCF, value depends on expected cashflow 
and the risk to that cashflow. The exercise is a two-step process: (1) forecast the future cashflow, and (2) 
discount it by the cost of capital.”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civ. A. No. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, 
at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (providing same description), rev’d on other grounds, 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 
1996).  
84. See KOLLER, GOEDHART & WESSELS, supra note 71, at 222 (recognizing “the difficulty of 
forecasting individual line items 10 to 15 years into the future”).  
85. See DAMODARAN, APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, supra note 82, at 553–54 (using ten-year 
forecast period); RHEE, supra note 73, at 90 (“typical forecast period of modeling is anywhere from 5 to 
20 years”); KOLLER, GOEDHART & WESSELS, supra note 71, at 222 (recommending 10–15 years but 
suggesting a “detailed five-year to seven-year forecast” with a simplified forecast for the remaining 
years). 
86. See RHEE, supra note 73, at 53–54, 90 (explaining the perpetuity formula and terminal value).  













hypothesis. This framework is so fundamental that a corporate manager 
“should rely on using the DCF approach for making strategic decisions.”88  
B. Intertemporal Model of Tradeoff  
Proponents of the short-termism hypothesis must contend with the 
obvious: in a tradeoff of intertemporal profits, a short-term strategy can be, 
and often is, the optimal strategy. If there is only cost and no gain from a 
decision—i.e., the inflation loss form of short-termism—the answer is clear 
and uncontroversial. The model here shows the rationality of a short-term 
strategy that all shareholders, regardless of time horizon, would favor, thus 
eliminating the distinction between short-term and long-term.89  
Before presenting the model, two assumptions are stated. First, any paper 
that substantially discusses firm value should explicitly state its assumption 
about market efficiency. 90  This paper assumes some degree of market 
inefficiency. It does not assume away the short-termism problem by 
assuming a perfect semi-strong efficient market. Markets are not perfect 
when pricing securities.91 Even some opponents of the hypothesis assume a 
                                                                                                               
88. TIM KOLLER, RICHARD DOBBS & BILL HUYETT, VALUE: THE FOUR CORNERSTONES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 102 (2011).  
89. Infra note 104 and accompanying text.  
90. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  
91. The ideas that markets are sometimes inefficient and that individuals and markets are not 
always rational (the premise of behavioral economics) have gained general acceptance. The Nobel Prize 
in economics has recently been awarded to Daniel Kahneman (2002), Robert Shiller (2012), and Richard 
Thaler (2017), for their contributions to the field of behavioral economics. Robert Shiller summarizes 
the basic perspective taken in this article: “[M]odern efficient-markets theory . . . says financial prices 
efficiently incorporate all available information and are in that sense perfect. In contrast, I have argued 
that the theory makes little sense, except in fairly trivial ways. Of course, prices reflect available 
information. But they are far from perfect.” Robert J. Shiller, Sharing Nobel Honors, and Agreeing to 
Disagree, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2013) https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/business/sharing-nobel-ho 
nors-and-agreeing-to-disagree.html. See DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 82, at 5 
(“It is best to approach market efficiency as a skeptic.”). Markets can be inefficient at times for a number 
of reasons. See generally Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the 
New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities 
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 183 (1992). Arbitrage in theory keeps 
securities prices in line with value, but there are limits to arbitrage in practice. See Andrei Shleifer & 
Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 52–54 (1997). Empirical analysis has shown 
that stock prices may be too volatile to be rationally explained. See Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices 
Move Too Much to be. Justified by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981); 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY (1992). Leading finance scholars have hypothesized that 
stock price may diverge from value in the short-term and the longer-term. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 
J. FIN. 529, 532 (1986). Logically, trading occurs because we cannot discern intrinsic value as 
ontological truth. Rhee, supra note 74, at 214. Historically, markets have systemically misvalued assets 
resulting in bubbles and crashes. See HAROLD L. VOGEL, FINANCIAL MARKET BUBBLES AND CRASHES 
(2009).  
 










degree of market inefficiency.92 Second, and relatedly, this paper assumes 
that profit, cashflow, value, and share price are rationally related, if not 
perfectly correlated. If profit is real and not an illusory gimmick, it 
eventually yields cashflow.93 Profit and cashflow add to firm value, which 
stock price eventually, if not perfectly, reflects. Market prices are ultimately 
anchored by value, however long or short the rode may be at any given 
time.94  
We start with a set of strategies that produces different cashflows. For 
simplicity, we limit the possible strategies to two { SS, SL }: SS is a short-
term strategy of increasing short-term cashflow by sacrificing long-term 
cashflow; SL is a long-term strategy of sacrificing short-term profit in 
exchange for increased long-term profit. These strategies produce different 
cashflows { CS, CL }. Depending on the amounts of intertemporal profit and 
loss resulting from different strategies, different firm values result from a 
manager’s intertemporal choice: { V(SS, CS), V(SL, CL) }.  
The model here presents a simple two phase cashflow analysis. The 
short-term period yields cashflow { C1, . . . , Cn }, and the long-term period 
yields { C(n +1), . . . , C∞ }. The choice between short-term and long-term 
strategy yields different cashflows in the short-term and the long-term time 
horizons: ±ΔS and ±ΔL. Suppose a firm faces an intertemporal tradeoff. It 
can increase or decrease profit ±ΔS per period in the short-term period 
{ 1, . . . , n }, and correspondingly this strategy can decrease or increase 
profit ±ΔL per period for the long-term period { (n + 1), . . . , ∞ }. 
Accordingly, there are many sets of conditions, in fact infinite in theory, 
where the short-term gain equals the long-term loss, and vice versa:  
 








This formulation simply states the obvious intuition that at some point 
the short-term profit gained equals the long-term cost incurred, and vice 
versa. As a matter of mathematical and financial truth, for any set of 
conditions, such as a given discount rate, the equilibria between short-term 
and long-term strategies is theoretically infinite. In practice, this means that 
for any set of facts and conditions confronting a manager, there are many 
                                                                                                               
92. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 1088 (assuming market inefficiency in an 
empirical study of stock prices before and after activist intervention); Bebchuk, supra note 24, at 1660–
76 (arguing that the short-termism hypothesis does not follow from an inefficient market).  
93. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 72, at 93–97.  
94. See Black, supra note 91, at 532 (stating that share price can deviate significantly from 
intrinsic value due to “noise” and suggesting that value may deviate from price by as much as favor of 












outcomes within a range of reasonable expectation from the choice of 
intertemporal strategies.  
A short-term strategy yields greater firm value if the value of the short-
term gain or the long-term loss is more by some value ε.  
 
      +ΔS,i + ε  >  –ΔL,i  
V(SS, CS) > V(SL, CL) 
      +ΔS,i   <  –(ΔL,i – ε) 
 
Likewise, a long-term strategy yields greater firm value under the opposite 
conditions.  
 
      +ΔS,i – ε  <   –ΔL,i 
V(SS, CS) < V(SL, CL) 
      +ΔS,i   <   –(ΔL,i + ε) 
 
Neither a long-term nor a short-term strategy is intrinsically superior. A 
specific time horizon is not a virtue. From the microeconomic perspective 
of managerial decision-making in the firm, the optimal strategy depends on 
the interplay of the firm’s cost of capital and the cost-benefit of 
intertemporal gains and losses given the context of the facts and conditions 
presented in the situation.  
C. Numeric Examples 
The model of intertemporal choice is simple but abstract. It states that in 
a tradeoff of profits, the optimal intertemporal choice depends on a time and 
risk value calculation of the costs and benefits. Numeric examples illustrate 
how it works and the general scale of the tradeoffs required for equilibrium 
between short-term and long-term strategies. The examples below portray a 
plausible, realistic picture of the sorts and scales of managerial decision-
making processes occurring in the corporate market. The important 
takeaway is that equilibria between the short-term or the long-term do not 
depend on fantastical or unrealistic numeric assumptions.  
Commentary often discusses time horizons in the abstract, but seldom 
commits to defining a period that is the “short-term.” Actual calculations 
require a commitment to real numbers. To numerically define a short-term 
period, we consider a number of factors. Five to twenty years is a typical 










forecast period for a DCF analysis.95 Five to seven years is a feasible period 
for detailed forecasting. 96  Five years is the period that some empirical 
scholars use to measure the short-term stock price effects of activist 
intervention. 97  Three to five years is a typical period to do strategic 
planning.98 Seven years is about the average tenure of a CEO.99 For a CEO 
in mid-tenure, this time horizon might be shorter.100 These lengths of time 
would be the focus of a CEO with a short-term horizon. There is also an 
absurdity consideration. It would be absurd for any corporate manager to 
enhance profit or share price for a year or two by sacrificing long-term 
sustained profit, if only because the careers of most senior managers are 
longer than a year or two. Given the totality of these considerations, the 
short-term is defined as years one through five, and the long-term as years 
six to perpetuity.101  
With the time horizons numerically defined, assume two strategies { SS, 
SL }. We start with a discount rate of 14.9%, but later will consider a range 
of discount rates (the precision of this discount rate will soon become 
apparent).  
Assume first a short-term strategy SS that adds short-term profit of +10 
for each year of a five-year short-term period resulting in a perpetual loss 
of long-term profit of –10 in each year from year six to perpetuity. Any 
profit and loss is added or deducted from a baseline cashflow of 100 per 
year. Any perpetual loss of future profit constitutes an infinite undiscounted 
sum. Under well-accepted theory of time value and valuation, such sums 
must be discounted by time and risk.102 The value V(SS, CS) calculated from 
this short-term strategy SS producing cash flows CS is the following.  
 
                                                                                                               
95. Supra note 85.  
96. KOLLER, GOEDHART & WESSELS, supra note 71, at 222.  
97. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 1089. 
98. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 62 (Del. Ch. 2011) (indicating that 
Airgas had a five-year plan); Miles Inc. v. Cookson America, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12,310, 1993 WL 547186, 
at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1993) (five-year plan); In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., C.A. No. 10554–
VCG, 2017 WL 2334852, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017) (three-year plan); Dunmire v. Farmers & 
Merchs. Bancorp of W. Pa., Inc., C.A. No. 10589–CB, 2016 WL 6651411, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 
2016) (three-year plan).  
99. Roe, supra note 8, at 996 & n.86. See OLESIŃSKI ET AL., supra note 60, at 23 (“[T]he mean 
tenure of outgoing CEOs among the 2,500 top listed companies in the world dropped from 8.8 years in 
1995 to 7.2 years in 2007.”).  
100. See OLESIŃSKI ET AL., supra note 99, at 29 chart 6 (indicating that 49.3% of CEOs in top 
listed companies in Europe serve less than four years).  
101. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 28 (noting that commentators have defined the transition 
period from short-term to long-term as between five to ten years); KOLLER, GOEDHART & WESSELS, 
supra note 71, at 222 (indicating five years a “short explicit forecast period”).  














The firm value is 671. Value allocation between the short-term and long-
term periods is 55% and 45%, respectively. In other words, 55% of the 
firm’s total value is attributable the short-term financial results of years one 
to five, and only 45% of total firm value is attributable to financial results 
in years six to perpetuity. It may be surprising to see that the shot-term 
profits of only five years account for the majority of the firm value.  
Assume a long-term strategy SL that results in cash flow CL: a sacrifice 
of short-term profit by –10 for each year of the five-year period resulting in 
a perpetual gain of long-term profit by +10 for each year. The undiscounted 
long-term gain is an infinite sum. The value V(SL, CL) calculated from this 




The firm value from the long-term strategy is 671, the same as the value 
from the short-term strategy. However, more value has been shifted to the 
long-term at the cost of short-term value. Value allocation between the 
short-term and long-term periods is 45% and 55%, respectively—the 
inverse of the short-term strategy. But the two strategies are financially 
equivalent. The example confirms that for a set of conditions { (+ΔS,i = –
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 to ∞
Cashflow 110     110     110     110     110     604     
Discount factor 0.870 0.757 0.659 0.574 0.499
Present value 96       83       73       63       55       302     
Total firm value (V) 671     100%
     V(1-5) 370     55% Percent V(1-5)
     V(6-∞) 302     45% Percent V(6-∞)
Short-Term Strategy
Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 to ∞
Cashflow 90       90       90       90       90       738     
Discount factor 0.870 0.757 0.659 0.574 0.499
Present value 78       68       59       52       45       369     
Total firm value (V) 671     100%
     V(1-5) 302     45% Percent V(1-5)
     V(6-∞) 369     55% Percent V(6-∞)
Longterm Strategy










ΔL,i) = (–ΔS,i = +ΔL,i), ri = 14.9% }, there is an equilibrium { V(SS, CS) = V(SL, 
CL) }.  
The model is not a quirk of numeric manipulation, and it does not depend 
on a particularly unique condition. For example, assume all facts in the 
above example, except the following: the short-term gain is not evenly 
spread out through years one to five (i.e., each year producing profit of 110), 
but instead it is a single-year profit of 150 in year three; thus, the cashflow 
for years one to five is CS (100, 100, 150, 100, 100). Under these facts, the 
firm values and value allocations are exactly identical to the above: { V(SS, 
CS) = 671, V(1–5) = 55%, V(6–∞) = 45% } and { V(SL, CL) = 671, V(1–5) = 
45%, V(6–∞) = 55% }.  
Again, these calculations are not quirks or manipulations. For example, 
the model does not require a unique, fixed discount rate. Let’s change the 
discount rate to reflect a riskier venture, for example a discount rate of 18%. 
The obvious intuition is that short-term cashflow will be valued relatively 
more than the long-term cashflow. This is just the mathematics of 
discounting.103 The effect of a higher rate over time diminishes the value of 
long-term cashflow. With all other assumptions the same, the results of 
short-term and long-term strategies are the following: VS = 563 (with V(1–
5) = 61% and V(6–∞) = 39%), and VL = 549 (with V(1–5) = 51% and V(6–
∞) = 49%). A higher discount rate reduces firm value, under both the short-
term and long-term strategies. But asset pricing suggests that for a higher 
risk company, the short-term strategy is the value maximizing strategy 
relative to a long-term strategy. The calculations confirm that the short-
strategy yields a firm value of 563 with greater proportional value attributed 
to the short-term, compared to 549 for the long-term strategy. The short-
term perspective is better.  
The intuition works in reverse. A less risky firm will maximize value by 
increasing the long-term cashflow. Assume a discount rate of 12%. The 
values from the two strategies are the following: VS = 822 (with V(1–5) = 
48% and V(6–∞) = 52%), and VL = 845 (with V(1–5) = 38% and V(6–∞) = 
62%). The long-term strategy creates more value than the short-term 
strategy. However, both strategies result in greater firm value than the prior 
example of a discount rate of 14.9% resulting in a firm value of 671. A lower 
discount rate produces greater value. The long-term perspective is better. 
Also, under both the short-term and long-term strategies, more value is 
allocated to the long-term period than the short-term period, though the 
long-term strategy sees the greater proportional allocation.  
                                                                                                               
103. For example, the perpetuity value of a value 10 discounted at 10% is 100 (= 10 ÷ 10%), 












The following table plots the change in values over different discount 




The implication here—that there are rational tradeoffs between the short-
term and the long-term—does not depend on the unique condition (±ΔS = 
±ΔL) or a specific discount rate. If the gains and losses in the short-term and 
long-term strategies are symmetrical, the equilibrium holds at any discount 
rate, though clearly the firm value changes with different sets of gains and 
losses. For example, assume that under a discount rate r (14.9%): (1) the 
short-term gain is twice as much as the long-term loss in the short-term 
strategy, and (2) the short-term loss is half as much as the long-term gain in 
the long-term strategy. The two strategies are equivalent:  
 
SS [ ΔS = +20, ΔL = –10 ]  =  SL [ ΔS = –10, ΔL = +20 ]   ⇒   V = 705 
 
Nor are symmetrical gains and loses required. For the discount rate r 
(8.45%) for example, these strategies are equivalents:  
 
SS [ ΔS = +15, ΔL = –10 ]  =  SL [ ΔS = –15, ΔL = +5 ]   ⇒   V = 1,164 
 
We need not belabor the point any further. These numeric examples 
suffice to illustrate the general proposition: There is always an innumerable 
set of conditions { (+ΔS,i, –ΔL,i, ri) or (–ΔS,i, +ΔL,i, ri) } yielding an 
equilibrium between intertemporal corporate strategies. One strategy is not 
inherently superior to the other. In a range of plausible situations, short-term 




















r  = 14.9%










enough. Small differences in intertemporal profits can tip the balance. The 
insights here apply generally.  
Viewed through this financial prism, the distinction between the short-
term and the long-term merges into the standard proposition that a manager 
should manage the business to maximize firm value.104 While Delaware 
courts frequently extol the virtue of the “long-term,”105 they acknowledge 
that a manager must engage in rational intertemporal tradeoffs.106 Since 
there are theoretically infinite equilibria points in such tradeoffs, 
corporation law cannot really intervene in the substance of business 
decision-making, as reflected in the business judgment rule.  
III. AIRGAS CASE STUDY 
The above theory of discounted cash flow and asset value is simple and 
uncontroversial in the abstract. But does it reflect reality? We can test the 
model of short-termism through a case study of one of the most prominent, 
closely watched Delaware hostile takeover battles in recent years. In Air 
Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery 
analyzed the issue of shareholder short-termism in the context of 
determining the propriety of the poison pill defense.107 The takeover saga 
provides a unique opportunity to test the intertemporal model of profit 
tradeoff because the facts and circumstance of the case enable precise 
calculations of shareholder returns under the short-term and long-term 
strategies in both actual and counterfactual scenarios. The case thus permits 
a theoretical and empirical assessment of the legal framework for dealing 
                                                                                                               
104. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he 
question of ‘long-term’ versus ‘short-term’ values is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are 
obliged to chart a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed 
investment horizon.”). 
105. See supra note 43.  
106. The following insight describes the possible tradeoffs and a manager’s duty to make such 
decisions: 
It also bears emphasizing that a duty to maximize long-term value does not always mean acting 
to ensure the corporation’s perpetual existence. A fiduciary might readily determine that a near-
term sale or other shorter-horizon initiative, such as declaring a dividend, is value-maximizing 
even when judged against the long-term. A trade bidder with access to synergies, for example, 
may offer a price for a corporation beyond what its standalone value could support. Or 
fiduciaries might conclude that continuing to manage the corporation for the long-term would 
be value destroying because of external market forces or other factors. The directors who 
managed the proverbial maker of horse-and-buggy whips would have acted loyally by selling 
to a competitor before the new-fangled horseless carriage caught on. 
Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., C.A. No. 12108–VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *19 (Del. 
Ch. Apr. 14, 2017).  
107. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (Airgas II), 16 A.3d 48, 67 (Del. Ch. 2011); Airgas, 













with short-term activist shareholders and the Delaware court’s ruling. The 
analysis here shows that the intertemporal choice confronting the target 
board was complex and contextual, even with the benefit of hindsight, and 
that the optimal choice ultimately depended on the relative profitability of 
the short-term choice versus the expectation of the long-term.  
A. Background and Chancery Court’s Analysis 
On October 15, 2009, Air Products and Chemicals (“Air Products”), a 
market leader in the industrial gas industry, privately approached Airgas, a 
midsize firm, about a potential acquisition. Private talks between the 
companies ensued. Air Products first offered $60 per share and then later 
upped the offer to $62 per share.108 On January 4, 2010, the Airgas board 
rejected this offer because it “grossly undervalue[d] Airgas.”109 The bid was 
opportunistic, the board believed, because Air Products timed the offer 
during the stock market crash related to the financial crisis of 2008–2009.110 
Undeterred, Air Products commenced a hostile takeover on February 4, 
2010. The tender offer was a fully-financed, all-shares, all-cash offer at $60 
per share, conditioned on the redemption of Airgas’s poison pill.111 The next 
day, Airgas shares incorporated the information into the price, which closed 
at $60.96. The offer provided a significant premium to Airgas’s trading 
price.112 Air Products later raised its offer several times: on July 8 to $63.50 
per share and again on September 6 to $65.50 per share.113 The Airgas board 
rejected these offers as “grossly inadequate.”114 
After the offer went public, the composition of Airgas’s shareholders 
changed abruptly. Short-term shareholders, who were merger arbitrageurs 
(hedge funds), rushed in to buy Airgas shares.115 The following chart shows 
the changing composition of shareholders over time.116 
                                                                                                               
108. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 65–66. 
109. Id. at 67.  
110. Id. at 70 (“In explaining its reasons for recommending that shareholders not accept Air 
Products’ offer, Airgas’s filing stated that the timing of the offer was ‘extremely opportunistic . . . in 
light of the depressed value of the Airgas Common shares prior to the announcement of the Offer,’ so 
while the timing was excellent for Air Products, it was disadvantageous to Airgas.”). 
111. Id. at 69.  
112. The offer provided a premium of 38% to Airgas’s closing share price on February 4, 27% 
over the thirty-day trading average, 29% over the fifty-two-week average, and 18% over the fifty-two-
week high. All stock price data on Airgas and Air Products were downloaded from Google Finance. See 
https://finance. google.com/finance.  
113. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 73, 76. 
114. Id. at 74, 76.  
115. CHARLES C.Y WANG, PAUL M. HEALY & KYLE THOMAS, HARVARD BUS. SCH., AIR 
PRODUCTS’ PURSUIT OF AIRGAS (B), CASE STUDY 9-116-025, at 2 (Nov. 17, 2015).  
116. Id. at 4 Exhibit 1 (providing data from Capital IQ).  













In the fourth quarter of 2009, before the public offer, about 70% of 
Airgas stock was held by traditional institutional shareholders with very 
little held by hedge funds. In the first quarter of 2010, when Air Products 
made its public offer, hedge funds seeking short-term profit on merger 
arbitrage rushed in to take a significant stake.117 They bought most of their 
shares from traditional institutional shareholders who were presumably 
longer-term investors.118 These short-term shareholders sought to influence 
the Airgas management,119 and they clearly wanted the Airgas board to sell 
the company.120 This new shareholder composition and the intent of hedge 
funds to force a sale presented the key legal issue: whether short-term 
shareholders posed a threat to corporate policy under the Unocal analysis.121  
                                                                                                               
117. Airgas’s chief financial officer commented on the sudden change in the shareholder base and 
its implication for Airgas: “Within 3 months of February, 40% of Airgas shares were transferred into 
the hands of arbitrage firms. That was a huge change in the complexion of the shareholder base. We 
continued to talk about long-term value creation and how it would exceed that provided by Air Products 
but long-term was not really a part of their lexicon because the arbs were in it for the quick deal. They’re 
all about quick money rather than making longer-term return. Their time horizon is very short.” 
CHARLES C.Y WANG, PAUL M. HEALY, PENELOPE ROSSANO & KYLE THOMAS, HARVARD BUS. SCH., 
AIR PRODUCTS’ PURSUIT OF AIRGAS (A), CASE STUDY 9-116-024, at 7 (Nov. 12, 2015).  
118. See infra note 141.  
119. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 76, 109 n.411.  
120. Id. at 76, 77, 105, 108, 109 n.411, 111 & n.424. “Air Products’ tender offer would almost 
certainly result in a ‘change of control’ transaction, as the offer would likely succeed in achieving greater 
than 50% support from Airgas’s stockholders, which largely consist of merger arbitrageurs and hedge 
funds who would gladly tender into Air Products’ offer.” Id. at 95 n.312. 











































Airgas had a staggered board and a shareholder rights plan (“poison 
pill”).122 This combination constitutes a formidable takeover defense.123 To 
successfully win a proxy battle, an acquirer must wage a two-year battle for 
control and redemption of the poison pill.124 The combined defense could 
potentially give a target board a “preclusive forever” power to rebuff all 
sales.125 Air Products fought the takeover battle on two fronts: a proxy 
contest for the control of the Airgas board, and a lawsuit to force the Airgas 
board to redeem the poison pill.  
Airgas had a nine-member staggered board.126 For the coming election 
cycle, Air Products nominated three independent directors for election.127 
On September 15, 2010, it won the vote and installed its three nominees to 
the Airgas board.128 Merger arbitrageurs delivered the necessary votes in 
this proxy battle.129 But Air Products needed to wait a full year to nominate 
another slate of three directors and thereby potentially install a majority of 
the board.130  
The takeover saga reached a fever pitch on December 9, 2010, when Air 
Products made its “best and final” offer of $70 per share and set it to expire 
on February 15, 2011.131 The Airgas board rejected this bid as “clearly 
inadequate” and stated that Airgas was worth at least $78 per share.132 In a 
surprising turn of events, the three newly elected Air Products nominees 
                                                                                                               
122. Id. at 57. 
123. See id. at 113 (“[N]o bidder to my knowledge has ever successfully stuck around for two 
years and waged two successful proxy contests to gain control of a classified board in order to remove 
a pill.”). See also Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.’s Migration 
to Delaware, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1, 39 (2010) (calling the combination an “impregnable takeover 
defense”). Cf. Strine, supra note 34, at 497 (commenting that staggered boards are becoming rare and 
thus it borders on “malpractice” for a company not to have a poison pill); Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, 
at 557 (same).  
124. Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover 
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 899 (2002); Versata 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010). 
125. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 113–14.  
126. Id. at 62. 
127. Id. at 71.  
128. Id. at 61, 77.  
129. Institutional Investor Services, a proxy advisory firm, recommended that shareholders vote 
in favor of Air Products’ nominees. WANG, HEALY, ROSSANO & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 1. About 
90% of hedge funds and merger arbitrageurs voted for the Air Products nominees. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 
117.  
130. At the September 2010 shareholder meeting, Air Products successfully amended the bylaws 
to change the annual meeting from September to January, thus shortening the term of the second class 
of directors in the staggered board to a four-month term. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 77. But the Delaware 
Supreme Court voided the bylaw amendment. Airgas I, 8 A.3d at 1190 n.18, 1194–95. As a result, Air 
Products had to wait a full year to nominate another class of directors.  
131. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 55, 86.  
132. Id. at 55–56, 90.  
 










agreed as a part of a unanimous Airgas board (they “changed teams” as the 
court loosely characterized this unexpected turn).133  
In light of the Airgas board’s continued resistance, Air Products could 
succeed in its tender offer only if the court ordered the board to redeem the 
poison pill.134 The key question was: When shareholders are fully informed 
of all information related to the value of the company and they are not 
subject to structural coercion in the tender offer,135 “who gets to decide 
when and if the corporation is for sale?”136 The court applied the Unocal 
two-prong test to determine the propriety of the poison pill.137 The Airgas 
board had to show that it had reasonable ground to believe a cognizable 
threat to corporate policy existed, and that its response was reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.138   
The issue of short-termism arose in the court’s analysis of the first prong 
of Unocal. The court ruled that a cognizable threat can take the form of 
“substantive coercion,” defined as the risk that the target’s stockholders 
might accept an inadequate offer because of ignorance or mistaken belief 
regarding the board’s assessment of the company’s long-term value.139 The 
Airgas board argued that it needed to maintain the poison pill to prevent Air 
Products from acquiring control at an unfair price. It argued that almost half 
of Airgas’s stockholders were merger arbitrageurs who wanted to tender 
into an inadequate offer because they would make a significant return on 
investment even if the offer grossly undervalued Airgas. In this situation, a 
minority of shareholders would be “coerced” into accepting an inadequate 
offer.140  
The court at first discounted the short-term and long-term dichotomy.141 
But it recognized the risk of short-termism, stating the issue: “is there 
evidence in the record that Airgas stockholders are so focused on the short-
term that they would take a smaller harvest in the swelter of August over a 
                                                                                                               
133. Id. at 58, 89, 122, 128.  
134. Id. at 56.  
135. Id. at 54, 77, 106.  
136. Id. at 54.  
137. Id. at 91–92. 
138. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
139. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 56–57, 108. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 
(Del. 1995) (“The record reflects that the Unitrin Board perceived the threat from American General’s 
Offer to be a form of substantive coercion.”); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1153 (Del. 1990) (holding that under the theory of “substantive coercion” “inadequate value” of an all-
cash for all-shares offer can be a “legally cognizable threat”). 
140. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 109.  
141. Short-term arbitrageurs “bought their shares from long-term stockholders who viewed the 
increased market price generated by Air Products’ offer as a good time to sell.” Id. In other words, both 













larger one in Indian Summer?”142 The court found that hedge funds would 
tender their shares regardless of Airgas’s potential long-term value.143 This 
reality posed a “clear risk” to the effectiveness of corporate policy because 
short-term shareholders could involuntarily throw the company into Revlon 
mode.144  
Why would sophisticated short-term shareholders, such as hedge funds, 
leave money on the table by accepting an inadequate offer?145 The choice 
depends on each shareholder’s rate of return. The long-term Indian Summer 
could yield a larger share price but a smaller rate of return, in which case 
the short-term August swelter would be the superior choice. To illustrate 
this crucial point, assume that a short-term shareholder invests 100 today. If 
it sells the stock in one year at 120, the rate of return is 20%. Now assume 
that a long-term shareholder makes the same investment and expects to sell 
the stock in five years at a 200; the rate of return is about 15%.146 The short-
term shareholder leaves 80 of long-term profit on the table, but the long-
term shareholder earns a lower rate of return. If the short-term shareholder 
is time neutral, the five-year return must be about 250 for it to be indifferent 
between the choice of 120 in year one or 250 in year five.147 The rate of 
return is important, and the rate depends on the time horizon. The short-
term choice is the superior economic choice, and thus rational, if it results 
in the higher rate of return even if the long-term hold presents the greater 
amount of return.  
The court found that short-term shareholders, holding in total almost half 
of all shares, would likely tender their shares into an inadequate offer. They 
would force the company into the Revlon zone, terminate its long-term 
strategy, and thus make irrelevant the board’s reasonable belief in the 
inadequacy of Air Products’ tender offer to all shareholders.148 In essence, 
shareholders would determine the corporate policy, and not the board. The 
case raises one of the most fundamental questions in corporate law and 
                                                                                                               
142. Id. at 111 (internal quotations omitted).  
143. Id. at 76, 109 n.441.  
144. “The articulated risk that does exist, however, is that arbitrageurs with no long-term horizon 
in Airgas will tender, whether or not they believe the board that $70 clearly undervalues Airgas.” Id. at 
110 n.414 (emphasis in original). See C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & 
Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (“Revlon made clear that when a board 
engages in a change of control transaction, it must not take actions inconsistent with achieving the 
highest immediate value reasonably attainable.”).  
145. See Heaton, supra note 8, at 359 (“The short-term/long-term complainants rarely try to 
provide a compelling response for why myopic shareholders would ignore the money they could make 
by waiting for large gains in the future . . . .”).  
146. 100 x (1 + 15%)5 = 201  
147. 100 x (1 + 20%)5 = 249  
148. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 109, 111–12.  
 










governance: What is the power allocation between managers and 
shareholders? 149  The court ruled that the board has the prerogative to 
determine whether or not an offer is inadequate.150 The court acknowledged 
that Delaware law does not sanction a “preclusive forever” defense, but “it 
does bring us one step closer to that result.”151  
The practical effect of the court’s ruling is that when challenging a 
board’s decision to opt for the long-term strategy over a short-term profit 
opportunity, most short-term shareholders would have a steep legal and 
economic hill to climb to defeat a board’s good faith, properly informed, 
and reasonable belief as to the adequacy of the offer.152 If the court had 
struck down the poison pill, it would have shifted the power to direct 
corporate policy from managers to a newly coalesced group of short-term 
shareholders in a situation where a board has not otherwise chosen to enter 
the Revlon zone.  
To be clear, though, this case does not endorse ‘‘just say never.’’ 
What it does endorse is Delaware’s long-understood respect for 
reasonably exercised managerial discretion, so long as boards are 
found to be acting in good faith and in accordance with their fiduciary 
duties (after rigorous judicial fact-finding and enhanced scrutiny of 
their defensive actions). The Airgas board serves as a quintessential 
example.153 
The court upheld the board’s prerogative to manage the company for the 
long-term.154 Even if shareholders are fully informed on the company’s 
value and the deal is structurally non-coercive, the board may “just say no” 
when it is informed, acts in good faith, and holds a reasonable belief of a 
legitimate threat to corporate policy.155 
 
 
                                                                                                               
149. See MM Cos., Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (“The most 
fundamental principles of corporate governance are a function of the allocation of power within a 
corporation between its stockholders and its board of directors.”). The allocation of power between 
shareholders and managers has been the subject of much academic attention. See, e.g., Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).  
150. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 112.  
151. Id. at 113, 129.  
152. Id. at 54, 109, 129.  
153. Id. at 129.  
154. “[T]he power to defeat an inadequate hostile tender offer ultimately lies with the board of 
directors.” Id. at 55. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–50 (Del. 1990). 













B. Counterfactual Analysis of Intertemporal Returns 
After the chancery court’s decision, Air Products ended its bid. But the 
Airgas saga lived on. Airgas stayed independent for a few more years, but 
continued to be the apple of acquirers’ eyes. It faced another informal 
approach from Air Products, and it had to contend with an influential 
activist shareholder who took a stake in Airgas.156 These events pressured 
Airgas to seek a friendly deal. On November 17, 2015, it agreed to be 
acquired by Air Liquide, another industry leader,157 for $143 per share, and 
the acquisition closed in 2016.158  
The Airgas takeover saga presents a unique opportunity to test the 
intertemporal model in a retrospective analysis. The Airgas board was 
presented with a choice between a short-term strategy and a long-term 
strategy. While there are innumerable instances in business history where a 
target company rejected an offer in favor of a long-term strategy, Airgas’s 
choice of the long-term strategy had a terminal point at which all 
shareholders fully monetized the company’s long-term strategy in a sale. 
Even this situation is not so special, occurring whenever a company is 
acquired. But in Airgas the public information provides a large cache of data 
and facts, and the case opinion engages in a specific, detailed analysis of 
the legality of a board’s intertemporal choice and the power of short-term 
shareholders in determining the company’s time horizon. A case study can 
answer the court’s specific question: Would it have been better to sell in the 
August swelter of 2011 at $70 rather than in the Indian Summer of 2016 at 
$143?  
With a few simple assumptions, we can precisely calculate the relative 
returns of shareholders with various time horizons. The rate of return R is 
calculated as: Purchase Price x (1 + R)(Hold Period) = Sale Price.159 Four 
variables determine the rate of return: purchase date and price, sale date and 
                                                                                                               
156. Leslie Picker, Why Airgas Was Finally Sold, for $10 Billion Instead of $5 Billion, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/business/dealbook/why-airgas-was-
finally-sold-for-10-billion-instead-of-5-billion.html.  
157. Four companies (Air Liquide, Air Products, Linde, Praxair) dominate the market for 
industrial packaged gas. WANG, HEALY, ROSSANO & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 1.  
158. Liz Moyer, Air Liquide to Acquire Airgas for $10.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 
17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/18/business/dealbook/air-liquide-to-acquire-airgas-for-1 
0-3-billion.html.  
159. See RHEE, supra note 73, at 179–81 (explaining internal rate of return calculations). The 
analysis does not calculate total return that includes dividends. Airgas has historically paid dividends. 
See Airgas, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 18 (May 27, 2010); Airgas, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-
K) 16 (May 30, 2007). Dividends increase the total return, but complicate the calculations. An analysis 
of share appreciation provides the clear, simple insight.  
 










price. Air Products’ public tender offer date of February 5, 2010 is the 
reference point to consider the outcomes of Airgas shareholders over time.  
Purchase dates.—We consider quarterly periods before the public tender 
offer: the first trading day of February, May, August, and November for 
2007–2009, and February 1, 2010 (just prior to the public tender offer). We 
also consider two post-offer dates: February 5, 2010, the first trading day 
incorporating Air Products’ first tender offer of $60 per share; July 9, 2010, 
the first trading day incorporating the second tender public offer of $63.50 
per share. These later two purchases incorporate much of the acquisition 
premium from the first tender offer, and many hedge funds and merger 
arbitrageurs invested during this period.160 
Sale dates.—We consider two sale dates. The first date assumes the 
counterfactual that Airgas pursued the short-term strategy and sold to Air 
Products, and shareholders tendered their shares on June 12, 2011, pursuant 
to the final offer of $70 per share.161 The second date is the actual fact that 
Airgas pursued the long-term strategy, and shareholders tendered their 
shares on May 20, 2016, pursuant to Air Liquide’s offer of $143 per share.  
Based on these purchase and sale assumptions, there are fifteen purchase 
dates constituting a representative sample of shareholder investment in 
Airgas stock over a three-year period before the consummation of Air 
Product’s tender offer and a nine-year period before a consummation of Air 
Liquide’s tender offer.162 The holding periods of Airgas shareholders range 
from less than one year to more than nine years. Per the intertemporal model, 
we define the short-term strategy as a holding period of five years or less, 
and the long-term strategy as a holding period of more than five years. 
The table below sets forth the rates of return under the short-term strategy 
implied in a sale of Airgas to Air Products at $70 in 2011 and a long-term 
strategy implied in a sale to Air Liquide at $143 in 2016. The boxed figures 
in the last two rows of purchase dates (February 5, 2010 and July 9, 2010) 
represent the post-announcement purchase of stock and subsequent sale by 
short-term hedge funds.  
 
                                                                                                               
160. WANG, HEALY & THOMAS, supra note 116 and accompanying chart.  
161. The assumed closing date for Air Products’ final and best offer of December 9, 2010, was 
calculated as the same length of time, 185 days, that the Air Liquide transaction closed from the date of 
the public offer of November 17, 2015.  
162. The purchase dates constitute only fifteen specific purchase dates in a 251-day trading year. 
Shareholder composition for many public companies changes constantly. Each purchase date and price 
will produce a unique rate of return. However, the fifteen dates constitute a fairly representative sample 
of stock purchases throughout the entire year. This is confirmed when we compare the average stock 
prices of the four quarterly days in the years 2007–2009 with the average yearly trading price: 2007 
(average price of four quarterly dates $45.36, average yearly price $45.71), 2008 (average price of four 
quarterly dates $47.75, average yearly price $48.75), 2009 (average price of four quarterly dates $42.22, 














These calculations are revealing. If shareholders purchased shares before 
Air Products’ first tender offer, long-term shareholders fared better by a 
small but tangible margin than short-term shareholders when their hold 
periods were substantially long, from August 1, 2008 and before. This 
period represents a hold period of 7.81 to 9.30 years. Short-term 
shareholders fared better when their hold periods were shorter, from 
November 3, 2008 and after but before Air Products’ first public tender 
offer. This period represents a hold period of 1.36 to 2.61 years. From a 
financial perspective, a tender of their shares to Air Products at $70 per 
share, rather than to Air Liquide at $143 per share, would have achieved a 
rate of return in the approximate range of 26%–39%, compared to long-term 
shareholders in the range of 18%–21%.  
If shareholders purchased shares after Air Products’ first tender offer, 
they would have been clearly better off if they had waited and tendered their 
shares to Air Liquide. These shareholders were merger arbitrageurs. They 
would have achieved a short-term rate of return of about 8%–11%, 
compared to the long-term return of about 14%–15%. The reason for lower 
returns is obvious. After the public announcement, Airgas’s share price 
incorporated the takeover premium in Air Product’s offer. The Air Liquide 
offer would have been better. Of course, no one is omniscient and could 
have known that Airgas would sell itself five years later, but as we will see 
the stock market prices behaved in a way that incorporated this expectation 














1-Feb-07 40.50 13.4% 4.36 years 14.5% 9.30 years Longterm
1-May-07 44.52 11.6% 4.12 years 13.7% 9.06 years Longterm
1-Aug-07 46.75 11.0% 3.87 years 13.5% 8.81 years Longterm
1-Nov-07 49.67 10.0% 3.61 years 13.2% 8.56 years Longterm
1-Feb-08 47.44 12.3% 3.36 years 14.2% 8.30 years Longterm
1-May-08 48.29 12.7% 3.12 years 14.4% 8.06 years Longterm
1-Aug-08 56.74 7.6% 2.86 years 12.6% 7.81 years Longterm
3-Nov-08 38.54 25.7% 2.61 years 19.0% 7.55 years Short-Term
2-Feb-09 36.54 31.8% 2.36 years 20.6% 7.30 years Short-Term
1-May-09 42.00 27.3% 2.12 years 19.0% 7.06 years Short-Term
3-Aug-09 45.25 26.5% 1.86 years 18.4% 6.80 years Short-Term
2-Nov-09 45.10 31.4% 1.61 years 19.3% 6.55 years Short-Term
1-Feb-10 44.76 38.9% 1.36 years 20.2% 6.30 years Short-Term
5-Feb-10 60.96 10.8% 1.35 years 14.5% 6.29 years Longterm
9-Jul-10 64.90 8.5% 0.93 years 14.4% 5.87 years Longterm
At Tender Offer Prices:  $70 Short-Term and $143 Longterm










into Airgas’s stock price in the post-termination (post-February 2011) 
years.163  
The above calculations are fanciful in one respect. They assume the 
plentiful existence of shareholders who hold shares for many years, 
including “short-term” shareholders who have held shares for more than two 
years. These kinds of shareholders are not unicorns, but they are rare. 
Several decades ago average hold periods of stock were measured in 
years.164 Now it is measured in months,165 and even traditional long-term 
shareholders hold for less than two years.166 Most Airgas shareholders who 
bought shares before the tender offer would have likely bought within two 
or three years; for them the short-term strategy of selling to Air Products 
would have been better. But recall that about half of Airgas’s shareholders 
were hedge funds that bought after the public tender offer.167 They were 
short-term shareholders seeking a quick profit, but among all shareholders 
they would have most benefitted from the long-term strategy. The irony is 
rich.  
The benefit of perfect hindsight shows that the Airgas board and the 
chancery court reasonably perceived “substantive coercion” in that short-
term merger arbitrageurs would have been better off with Airgas’s long-
                                                                                                               
163. See infra Section III.C.  
164. See Berger, Solomon & Benjamin, supra note 8, at 298 (average holding period ranged from 
about three to five years between 1960 to 1980, two years in 1990); Dallas, supra note 22, at 297 (seven 
years in 1960 and two years in 1992); Robert C. Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: 
Focus on Executive Compensation, GOVERNANCE STUD. AT BROOKINGS, May 2014, at 3 n.5 (seven 
years in 1960 to two years in 1992). 
165. See Harold Weston & Conrad Ciccotello, Flash Traders (Milliseconds) to Indexed 
Institutions (Centuries): The Challenges of an Agency Theory Approach to Governance in the Era of 
Diverse Investor Time Horizons, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 615 (2018) (noting that the average stock 
hold period as 200 days) (citing Quick and Dirty, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.economi 
st.com/business/2016/10/06/quick-and-dirty); Rachelle Sampson & Yuan Shi, Are Investor Time 
Horizons Shortening?, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 543, 544–45 (2018) (“At the same time, holding periods 
for shares collapsed from the average of seven years in 1940 to seventeen weeks in 2015.”); Lynn A. 
Stout, The Toxic Side Effects of Shareholder Primacy, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2003, 2017 (2013) (“[T]he 
average holding period for stocks listed on U.S. exchanges has declined from eight years in 1960 to 
around four months today.”); Berger, Solomon & Benjamin, supra note 8, at 298 (seventeen weeks in 
2015); Dallas, supra note 22, at 297 (4.5 months for some investors such as hedge funds); Pozen, supra 
note 164, at 3 n.5 (less than 8 months in 2007); Sy Harding, Stock Market Becomes Short Attention Span 
Theater Of Trading, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2011) (eight years in 1960 to six months in 2010), https://www. 
forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/01/21/stock-market-becomes-short-attention-span-theater-of-
trading/#4d3b57ba703e; Jesse Eisinger, Challenging the Long-Held Belief in ‘Shareholder Value’, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 27, 2012) (“The average holding period of a stock was eight years in 1960; 
today, it’s four months.”), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/challenging-the-long-held-belief-
in-shareholder-value.  
166. See Mark Roe, Are Stock Markets Really Becoming More Short Term?, PROJECT SYNDICATE, 
Feb. 21, 2013, (average hold period of 1.5 years in 2010 for long-term investors like the mutual funds 
Fidelity and Vanguard).  













term strategy of selling to Air Liquide in 2016 rather than selling to Air 
Products in 2011. The Airgas board was correct when it argued that it was 
trying to save the short-term shareholders from themselves.168  
The Airgas board believed that $70 per share was inadequate and that 
$78 per share was adequate. The board’s hindsight auspiciousness is clearly 
evident when we consider its negotiation position. The board reasonably 
believed that the $70 per share offer price was inadequate, and it sought $78 




Two insights follow. First, the price the Airgas board sought ($78 per 
share) would have benefited virtually all shareholders irrespective of their 
relative holding periods, including the rare long-term shareholders who held 
their shares for many years and even the short-term shareholders who 
bought after the public announcement. Second, as the intertemporal model 
of profit tradeoff clearly shows, there is always a set of conditions in which 
                                                                                                               
168. The chancery court quoted the CEO of Airgas who testified that the merger arbitrageurs 
needed to be “protected from themselves.” Id. at 104. Of course, the Airgas board could not have known 
with certainty that shareholders would do better with the long-term plan, resulting in an eventual sale to 
Air Liquide. However, it is reasonable to infer that the Airgas board’s decision at the time incorporated 
a belief, based on existing information, that Airgas’s prospects would be better for shareholders on a 
long-term basis. Thus, the hindsight nature of the analysis here does not diminish the correctness of the 
Airgas board’s decision at the time.  
169. Id. at 55–56, 89.  
 














1-Feb-07 40.50 16.2% 4.36 years 14.5% 9.30 years Short-Term
1-May-07 44.52 14.6% 4.12 years 13.7% 9.06 years Short-Term
1-Aug-07 46.75 14.2% 3.87 years 13.5% 8.81 years Short-Term
1-Nov-07 49.67 13.3% 3.61 years 13.2% 8.56 years Short-Term
1-Feb-08 47.44 15.9% 3.36 years 14.2% 8.30 years Short-Term
1-May-08 48.29 16.6% 3.12 years 14.4% 8.06 years Short-Term
1-Aug-08 56.74 11.8% 2.86 years 12.6% 7.81 years Longterm
3-Nov-08 38.54 31.1% 2.61 years 19.0% 7.55 years Short-Term
2-Feb-09 36.54 38.0% 2.36 years 20.6% 7.30 years Short-Term
1-May-09 42.00 34.0% 2.12 years 19.0% 7.06 years Short-Term
3-Aug-09 45.25 34.1% 1.86 years 18.4% 6.80 years Short-Term
2-Nov-09 45.10 40.6% 1.61 years 19.3% 6.55 years Short-Term
1-Feb-10 44.76 50.5% 1.36 years 20.2% 6.30 years Short-Term
5-Feb-10 60.96 20.1% 1.35 years 14.5% 6.29 years Short-Term
9-Jul-10 64.90 22.0% 0.93 years 14.4% 5.87 years Short-Term
At Tender Offer Prices:  $78 Short-Term and $143 Longterm










the short-term strategy is more profitable than the long-term strategy. In this 
transaction, that condition is met when the short-term price is $78 per share.  
The Airgas board’s $78 price was probably a negotiation posture. Once 
a seller states an initial offering price as the Airgas board did, negotiation 
norms and expectations would make it difficult to ratchet that number 
upward during the negotiation process.170 The tea leaves of facts indicate 
that the Airgas board was likely positioning to negotiate a sale price between 
$70 and $78. 171 Consider then a hypothetical where the two companies 
agreed on sale at the midpoint of $74 per share.172  
 
                                                                                                               
170. The typical negotiation pattern of a seller is to offer a high aspirational selling price and then 
usually the parties negotiate toward the middle. See DONALD G. GIFFORD & ROBERT J. RHEE, LEGAL 
NEGOTIATION 158–61 (3d ed. 2016). 
171. In a letter dated Nov. 2, 2010 to Air Products, the Airgas board stated: “To provide greater 
clarity, the board has unanimously concluded that it believes that the value of Airgas in a sale is at least 
$78 per share, in light of our view of relevant valuation metrics.” Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 81 (emphasis 
omitted). Airgas’s CEO also testified that Airgas would have been open to negotiation if Air Products 
“were to offer $70, with an indication that they were ready to sit down and have a full and fair discussion 
about real value and negotiate from that . . . .” Id. at 76. A prominent Airgas shareholder wrote a letter 
to the board stating: “We hope that the demand for $78 per share is a negotiating position. As an Airgas 
stockholder, we strongly believe that the Airgas board could accept a significant discount from $78 per 
share and still get a good deal for the Airgas stockholders.” Id. at 111 n.424. The court found that two 
companies made a “legitimate attempt between the parties to reach some sort of a meeting of the minds” 
on Airgas’s valuation in light of Air Products’ $65.50 offer at the time and Airgas’s $78 marker set in 
its letter. Id. at 81. The negotiation broke down because Air Products submitted and held to a “final and 
best offer” of $70 per share. Id. at 87–89. 
172. This price presents a 70% premium to Airgas’s closing price before the public tender on 
February 4, 2010, and a 23% increase from the original $60 tender offer price containing a 38% premium 
from the February 4th closing price. The $14 per share increase would represent the fruit of the Airgas 















The above table shows that at $74 per share, most shareholders, 
including the short-term hedge funds holding half of all shares, would have 
benefitted from a sale to Air Products. Even when the long-term strategy is 
superior for some very long-term shareholders, the advantage is marginal at 
best. The price of $74 seems to be in the vicinity of this inflection point 
where the short-term strategy would be superior to the long-term strategy.  
In hindsight, the chancery court’s analysis of substantive coercion 
proved sound.173 However, the decision left an open issue: What if Air 
Products had offered $74 as its best and final offer and the Airgas board 
held firm at $78?174 Assume all material facts in the actual case,175 and 
assume that both prices were demonstrated to be adequate per traditional 
analytical methods such as an appraisal-like evaluation of Airgas’s business 
plan and valuation. Who decides the corporate strategy under these facts?  
The answer depends on one of two potentially dispositive factors: (1) the 
objective adequacy of the price based on fact-finding; (2) the board’s 
reasonable belief that the price is inadequate. The two inquiries are not the 
same. Price is a continuum. At some point, it crosses over from “inadequate” 
                                                                                                               
173. The chancery court found that the Airgas board served as a “quintessential example” of good 
faith decision-making in battling a hostile takeover. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 129. 
174. The $4 difference in the offers is a difference of about $350 million in acquisition price. 
Airgas, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) F-6 (Mar. 31, 2011) (86.6 million shares outstanding).  
175. The unanimous Airgas board, including the three Air Products nominees, acted in subjective 
good faith and advisedly. The tender offer was structurally non-coercive, all-cash, and fully financed. 
Shareholders were fully informed of all information related to the value of Airgas.  














1-Feb-07 40.50 14.8% 4.36 years 14.5% 9.30 years Short-Term
1-May-07 44.52 13.1% 4.12 years 13.7% 9.06 years Longterm
1-Aug-07 46.75 12.6% 3.87 years 13.5% 8.81 years Longterm
1-Nov-07 49.67 11.7% 3.61 years 13.2% 8.56 years Longterm
1-Feb-08 47.44 14.1% 3.36 years 14.2% 8.30 years Longterm
1-May-08 48.29 14.7% 3.12 years 14.4% 8.06 years Short-Term
1-Aug-08 56.74 9.7% 2.86 years 12.6% 7.81 years Longterm
3-Nov-08 38.54 28.5% 2.61 years 19.0% 7.55 years Short-Term
2-Feb-09 36.54 34.9% 2.36 years 20.6% 7.30 years Short-Term
1-May-09 42.00 30.7% 2.12 years 19.0% 7.06 years Short-Term
3-Aug-09 45.25 30.3% 1.86 years 18.4% 6.80 years Short-Term
2-Nov-09 45.10 36.1% 1.61 years 19.3% 6.55 years Short-Term
1-Feb-10 44.76 44.8% 1.36 years 20.2% 6.30 years Short-Term
5-Feb-10 60.96 15.5% 1.35 years 14.5% 6.29 years Short-Term
9-Jul-10 64.90 15.2% 0.93 years 14.4% 5.87 years Short-Term
At Tender Offer Prices:  $74 Short-Term and $143 Longterm










to “adequate” as a factual matter. Adequacy is not a single price but a range 
of reasonable prices. At some point, the target board’s asking price crosses 
over from the range of the adequate to the unreasonable, a price at which 
the board cannot reasonably justify raising the inference that it is not acting 
in the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. Consider the 
following scenario in which: (1) $70 is objectively inadequate; (2) a range 




What if the board’s belief is reasonable but erroneous (e.g., the board 
believes that $74 is inadequate when in fact it is adequate)?176 
Under the first prong of Unocal, the target board must show that it had 
“had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed.”177 Laws of various fields show that reasonableness 
is a flexible concept.178 It can encompass conflicting ideas or actions.179 One 
can hold a reasonable belief of a threat based on the circumstances,180 even 
                                                                                                               
176. If the board honestly but unreasonably held an unreasonable price as an adequate offer (e.g., 
a price of $90 per share which would represent a 107% premium based on the prior day’s closing price), 
there would be no reasonable belief of a legitimate threat to corporate policy under Unocal. If the board 
knew the offer was adequate but stonewalled the deal, there would be no subjective belief of a legitimate 
threat and thus the board would be acting in bad faith. 
177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (emphasis added). 
178. See, e.g., Resser v. Boise-Cascade Corp., 587 P.2d 80, 84 (Or. 1978) (noting “the more 
flexible concept of ‘reasonable care under the circumstances’”); U.S. v. Hawkins, 228 F. App’x 107, 
109 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[r]easonableness is a flexible concept” in the context of reviewing a trial court’s 
sentencing decision); Culver v. State, 956 A.2d 5, 19 (Del. 2008) (“[r]easonableness is a flexible concept” 
in the context of government searches) (quoting Williams v. State, 331 A.2d 380, 382 (Del. 1975)).  
179. For example, tort law has long taught us that reasonableness is not a deductive analysis. See 
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934) (Cardozo, J.). Contradictory actions could be 
considered reasonable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Tedla v. Ellman, 19 N.E.2d 987, 991 (N.Y. 
1939).  
180. The Unocal framework is the same framework found in the law of self-defense in torts, which 
is based on reasonable belief of a threat and reasonable response to the threat. Robert J. Rhee, The Tort 
Foundation of Duty of Care and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1181 (2013). See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63(1), 70(1) (1965).  
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though that belief is factually erroneous.181 In Airgas, the court focused on 
the factual existence of a legitimate threat to determine whether the board 
had reasonable grounds to believe in a threat to corporate policy. “The threat 
that merger arbs will tender into an inadequately priced offer is only a 
legitimate threat if the offer is indeed inadequate.”182 The board’s action 
cannot forever preclude an acquisition “if the price is right.”183 The only 
way to protect shareholders from substantive coercion “is for courts to 
ensure that the threat is real.”184  
To determine whether the offer was adequate, the court could have 
engaged in an appraisal-like judicial inquiry into the company’s business 
plan and fundamental value. But it declined to do so.185 Instead, the court 
found the offer adequate based on the independent directors’ subjective, 
good faith, informed beliefs; it found the board’s credibility “more 
confidence-inspiring than judicial review of the board’s business plan.”186 
In this regard, the court’s analysis leaves open an important question. 
Suppose under a Unocal analysis the court performs an independent 
appraisal-like analysis, and it finds that the offer is adequate in fact. Is a 
board’s belief in the inadequacy of an offer unreasonable as a matter of law 
in light of the non-existence of a legitimate threat to corporate policy? Or, 
can a board’s belief in the inadequacy of the offer be reasonable as a matter 
of fact in spite of the non-existence of a legitimate threat?  
The plasticity of reasonableness can encompass a board’s reasonable 
belief in the inadequacy of an offer that is factually incorrect in a searching, 
enhanced judicial review of firm value. If the factual adequacy of the offer 
is the dispositive factor—i.e., “courts [must] ensure that the threat is 
real”187—there is a viable path that acquirers and target shareholders can 
take in the control of a target’s corporate policy in a tender offer. The court 
or the shareholder must establish that the price is right. This approach has 
much appeal: If an all-cash, all-shares offer is structurally non-coercive and 
is factually adequate, and shareholders have all available information, what 
                                                                                                               
181. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63(1), 70(1), Reporter’s Notes (1965) (noting that 
virtually all cases recognize a self-defense privilege when “the actor erroneously, but reasonably” 
believes a threat exists).  
182. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 109 (emphasis added).  
183. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).  
184. Id. at 109–10 (emphasis added) (quoting Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 326 (Del. 
Ch. 2000)).  
185. Id. at 110 n.419.  
186. Id. at 110 n.419, 128. 
187. Id. at 110.  
 










is the reason for blocking the tender offer, other than the board disagrees 
with shareholders?188  
On the other hand, if a board’s reasonable belief is the dispositive factor 
in spite of factual adequacy—i.e., “reasonable grounds for believing that a 
danger to corporate policy”189—the Airgas court may have been prophetic 
in suggesting that deference to reasonable managerial belief may bring us 
one step closer to a preclusive forever defense when there is a poison pill.190 
Although Unocal is an enhanced scrutiny, reasonableness is a flexible 
concept and reasonable belief may encompass erroneous belief in fact.191 If 
a court finds a belief reasonable only on the ground that it is informed and 
in good faith, without leeway for an independent analysis or an opportunity 
for the plaintiff shareholder to prove factual adequacy, in what way is an 
“exacting” and “rigorous” 192  scrutiny anything other than dressed up 
business judgment deference to a board’s substantive decision? The answer 
to these questions depends on a fundamental policy choice.  
C. Financial Performance and Stock Price Analysis 
The Airgas takeover saga provides one more lesson. The failed takeover 
and the exit of short-term hedge funds ended within a discrete time period, 
but the episode continued to affect Airgas’s stock price for seven years. A 
stock price study provides insights into the possible effects of shareholder 
intervention on post-bid stock price movements.  
The first observation is that before the tender offer, the relative stock 
price relationship between Air Products and Airgas was well defined over a 
sustained period of time. The chart below shows the relative stock price 
performance for the five-year period 2005 to 2009, which is the five years 
before the public tender offer in February 2010.193  
 
                                                                                                               
188. The chancery court was even skeptical that an offer could be deemed inadequate “in the 
context of a nondiscriminatory, all-cash, all-shares, fully financed offer poses any ‘threat’—particularly 
given the wealth of information available to Airgas’s stockholders at this point,” though it acknowledged 
that Delaware law permits a finding of inadequacy based on the concept of substantive coercion. Id. at 
56–57.  
189. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
190. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 113, 129.  
191. See supra note 181. 
192. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 54, 129.  
193. Since stock prices may have different absolute prices, relative stock price charts calculate the 
relative performance of stock over time by recalculating the stock price to a common base of 100. This 
technique permits a true comparison. Note that the large decline in stock prices of both companies in 














Airgas stock price increased more than Air Products stock price. The 
Airgas board cited Airgas’s superior stock performance as the one of the 
main factors supporting its view that Air Products’ offers “grossly 
undervalue[d]” Airgas. 194  The price difference measured against Air 
Products’ stock (the “price delta”) was about +20%, meaning that Airgas’s 
stock enjoyed a 20% premium to Air Products’ stock over the five-year 
period. At the end of 2009 the price delta was +26%.  
What accounted for Airgas’s higher stock price? The answer is found in 
each company’s fundamental financial measures over a corresponding 
period. The following tables provide profitability and margin data.195  
 
 
                                                                                                               
194. See Airgas, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Feb. 10, 2010) 
(providing Airgas’s February 9, 2010 letter to Air Products).  
195. All financial data were from each company’s Forms 10-Q and 10-K. Pro forma financials 
were created in light of the fact that Airgas has a March fiscal year and Air Products has a September 
fiscal year. Quarterly results were calculated from the Forms 10-Q and 10-K, and pro forma financials 
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Average Δ (2005-2009) 
= +20% Airgas
Airgas Revenue and Profit ($ million)
Pro forma Dec. year end 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 CAGR
Revenue 2,706 3,098 3,784 4,444 3,884 9.5%
Operating profit 247 322 411 568 432 15.0%
Net income 114 144 203 269 243 20.7%
Operating profit margin 9.1% 10.4% 10.9% 12.8% 11.1% 5.1%
Net income margin 4.2% 4.7% 5.4% 6.0% 6.2% 10.3%














These data explain much of Airgas’s superior stock price performance. 
While Air Products enjoyed higher profit margins, it was a slower growing 
company. Airgas’s compounded average growth rates (CAGR) of revenues, 
operating profits, and net profits were in the 10% to 21% range, indicating 
a fast growing company.196 The CAGRs for Airgas’s profit margins were 
also growing, indicating that its operations were becoming more efficient 
over time. In sum, Airgas represented the more significant upside potential. 
Compare these growth rates to the growth rates of Air Products.  
Airgas’s premium is not explained by increasing valuations—i.e., 
multiple expansion on the part of Airgas’s multiples related to Air Products’ 
multiples.197 The following table provides average price-to-earnings (P/E), 
price-to-book value of equity (P/B), and enterprise value to operating profit 
(EV/EBIT) ratios.198  
 
                                                                                                               
196. Airgas historically relied on acquisitions in a fragmented packaged gas industry to grow the 
company. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 60.  
197. “Multiple expansion” refers to increasing valuation attributable to the financial market 
pricing the stock at higher multiples than in the past. For example, if a stock trades at price-to-earnings 
(P/E) ratio of 10x and earnings are 10, then the stock would trade at 100; and, if the P/E multiple expands 
to 12x earnings, the same stock at earnings of 10 would trade at 120. On the other hand, stock can also 
increase because earnings increase. If the P/E multiple remains 10x but earnings increase from 100 to 
120, the stock would trade at 120. In the case of Airgas over the 2005–2010 period, most of the stock 
increase resulted from increased financial measures rather than multiple expansion.  
198. These ratios represent multiples of a firm’s financial measures such as net income, operating 
profit, and book value of equity. For example, suppose two firms, A and B, have $100 in net income and 
100 shares outstanding. Their earnings-per-share is $1 per share. Firm A trades at a P/E of 10x and firm 
B at 20x. This means that the share price of firm A is $10 per share, and its market capitalization is 
$1000, whereas those of firm B are $20 and $2000, respectively. Multiples measure a company’s value. 
Firm B’s P/E of 20x shows that its stock is valued twice as much as that of firm A. Stock price, in and 
of itself, is not a measure of value. To illustrate, suppose firm B engages in a two-for-one stock split. It 
now has 200 shares outstanding, and as a result its stock price would decline to $10 per share, the same 
as that of firm A, but its P/E multiple would still be 20x, twice that of firm A (i.e., earning-per-share of 
$0.5 per share at a stock price of $10 per share would result in a P/E multiple of 20x). See generally 
RHEE, supra note 73, at 82–87 (discussing multiples as market-based valuation measures).  
 
Air Products Revenue and Profit ($ million)
Pro forma Dec. year end 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 CAGR
Revenue 7,793 9,004 9,288 10,202 8,234 1.4%
Operating profit 1,010 1,120 1,439 1,230 1,077 1.6%
Net income 726 773 1,069 720 826 3.3%
Operating profit margin 13.0% 12.4% 15.5% 12.1% 13.1% 0.2%














Airgas’s multiples are not increasing over time. The valuation multiples 
of both companies were trading at a relatively stable range, both with respect 
to each other’s multiples and internally over time. 199  Indeed, Airgas’s 
multiples suffered a significant contraction during the financial crisis of 
2008–2009 while Air Products’ valuation fared better, which supports the 
Airgas board’s view that Air Products’ offer was opportunistic.200 Airgas’s 
relative stock price performance is explained by the growth of the 
company’s financial performance.  
The above pre-tender offer financial and stock price performances 
provide a baseline for comparing the post-tender offer performances. The 
chart below shows the relative stock price performance for the period 
January 2008 to May 2016, which encompasses two years before the tender 
offer (2008–2009), the year in which the public takeover battle was active 
(2010), and the post-failed takeover years including Air Liquide’s ultimate 
acquisition (2011–2016).  
 
                                                                                                               
199. The P/E multiple is the ratio of market capitalization to net income. The P/B multiple is the 
ratio of market capitalization to the book value of equity. The EV/EBITDA is the ratio of enterprise 
value (EV), which is the market capitalization plus long-term debt, to earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). See generally RHEE, supra note 73, at 82–86 (describing 
various valuation multiples).  
200. Airgas II, 16 A.3d at 70.  
Pro forma Dec. year end 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average
Airgas
    P/E 20.5 x 22.8 x 21.8 x 16.6 x 14.4 x 19.2 x
    P/B 2.4 x 3.0 x 3.1 x 2.8 x 2.1 x 2.7 x
    EV/EBIT 12.8 x 12.8 x 13.9 x 11.2 x 10.9 x 12.3 x
Air Products
    Price-to-earnings 19.5 x 19.7 x 20.0 x 19.4 x 21.1 x 20.0 x
    Price-to-book 2.9 x 3.0 x 3.4 x 3.5 x 2.9 x 3.1 x
    EV/EBIT 16.0 x 16.1 x 16.8 x 15.1 x 18.7 x 16.6 x












This chart is striking. The average price delta over the 2008–2009 pre-
offer period was +16%, and it was +12% on February 4, 2010, the day 
before the public announcement. Expectedly, Airgas’s premium increased 
after Air Products’ public tender offer on February 5, 2010, in response to 
the takeover price.201 Unexpectedly, however, Airgas’s premium increased 
over the five-year 2011–2015 period after the withdrawal of Air Products’ 
bid on February 15, 2011. When the takeover bid ended, the price delta was 
+29%. From the end of Air Products’ bid to just before Air Liquide’s 
acquisition announcement,202 the average price delta was +69%. This is 
almost 3.5 times the average price delta of the 2005–2009 period (+20%) 
when Airgas was fast growing. 203  The largest price delta was +122% 
occurring on March 6, 2013. After the failed acquisition, Airgas stock 
experienced a stock price inflation for a substantial period of time. But by 
the time that Air Liquide made its offer, Air Products had closed most of 
the gap in the 2011 to 2014 period, suggesting that Air Liquide 
opportunistically timed its offer when Airgas’s stock price lost most of its 
post-intervention inflation.  
What accounts for the widening price delta after Air Products ended its 
takeover bid? One possible answer is that Airgas continued to grow faster 
than Air Products. The hostile tender offer jolted Airgas into improving its 
business prospects and proving to shareholders that the long-term strategy 
                                                                                                               
201. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text (providing information on the acquisition 
premium offered by Air Products).  
202. This period is from February 16, 2011 to November 16, 2015.  








Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
Stock Price Performance Jan. 2008―May 2016
Air Products offer
Air Liquide offer
Δ max = +122%
3/6/13



















was better. But the data does not support this answer. The following tables 







Airgas’s financial measures continued to increase in the 2011–2016 
period, but their growth rates were less than the 2005–2009 period. The 
efficiency gains in the profit margins have also slowed. In comparision, the 
results for Air Products have not changed as dramatically in the two time 
periods, though significantly net profit remained flat. Airgas’s financial 
performance slowed in the years after the termination of Air Products’ 
takeover attempt both internally and relatively.  
Another explanation for the widening price delta between the two 
companies is multiple expansion for Airgas. Data supports this answer for 
the period of time when Airgas’s stock price substantially diverged from 
stock price of Air Products. The following chart provides the progression of 
each company’s valuation multiples.  
 
Airgas Revenue and Profit ($ million)
Pro forma Dec. year end 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 CAGR
Revenue 4,608 4,936 5,068 5,271 5,321 3.7%
Operating profit 527 590 633 644 596 3.1%
Net income 288 343 349 369 348 4.8%
Operating profit margin 11.4% 12.0% 12.5% 12.2% 11.2% -0.5%
Net income margin 6.3% 6.9% 6.9% 7.0% 6.5% 1.1%
Air Products Revenue and Profit ($ million)
Pro forma Dec. year end 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 CAGR
Revenue 9,604 9,853 10,164 10,454 9,690 0.2%
Operating profit 1,501 1,301 1,337 1,373 1,771 4.2%
Net income 1,242 1,224 1,044 1,032 1,352 2.1%
Operating profit margin 15.6% 13.2% 13.2% 13.1% 18.3% 4.0%
Net income margin 12.9% 12.4% 10.3% 9.9% 14.0% 1.9%












The following charts track the P/E and P/B ratios over the period Q1 
2004 to Q3 2015.204 They confirm Airgas’s multiple expansion in the post-




                                                                                                               
204. The period Q1 2010 to Q1 2011 constitutes Air Products’ failed takeover bid. This period is 
indicated by the gray bar in the charts. Average multiples for before and after this period were calculated.  
Pro forma Dec. year end 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average
Airgas
    P/E 20.1 x 20.3 x 22.4 x 23.0 x 21.7 x 21.5 x
    P/B 3.3 x 3.6 x 4.7 x 4.2 x 3.9 x 3.9 x
    EV/EBIT 14.9 x 14.7 x 15.7 x 15.9 x 15.2 x 15.3 x
Air Products
    Price-to-earnings 15.7 x 14.4 x 19.3 x 26.4 x 28.2 x 20.8 x
    Price-to-book 3.1 x 2.8 x 3.0 x 3.6 x 4.2 x 3.3 x


























































Average before (2004 to 2009) and after (Q2 2011 to Q3 2015)
Airgas:  before 19.4x, after 21.5x 














When compared with the 2005–2009 period, Airgas stock experience 
multiple expansion in the several years after the failed takeover. The 
opposite is true for Air Products for the years 2011–2013. Airgas gained and 
Air Products lost value, thus opening the large price delta. The capital 
markets were valuing Airgas at a higher level than in the previous period. 
But this answer raises its own question. When financial measures are 
slowing down, both internally and relatively, why would the financial 
markets increase Airgas’s valuation?  
There is no clear answer. The efficient market hypothesis states that 
stock prices incorporate public information into the stock. 205  The most 
important package of public information is financial performance as 
disclosed in financial statements. But this information does not support a 
theory of Airgas’s relative premium. Randomness is probably not an answer 
because the price movement has been upwards only and sustained over a 
period of years.  
In explaining stock prices, one must caveat analysis with the caution that 
there is always an element of speculation. Segregating noise and 
information is difficult in securities analysis.206 Randomness (noise) and 
fundamental financial measure (information) do not fully explain Airgas’s 
                                                                                                               
205. Supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  
206. “Information” is a fact or condition that is relevant to the value of stock. Noise is “the 
arbitrary element in expectations,” the diverse array of unrelated elements that causes price to deviate 
from intrinsic value. Black, supra note 91, at 529–30. “The price of a stock reflects both information 






























































Average before (2004 to 2009) and after (Q2 2011 to Q3 2015)
ARG:  before 2.6x, after 4.0x 
APD:  before 3.0x, after 3.3x 










stock price. However, the capital markets also had an important piece of 
fact—Airgas was the subject of a hostile takeover and activist shareholder 
involvement. That attempt failed, but the financial markets are forward-
looking. There was the possibility of a future takeover, which ultimately 
manifested in Air Liquide’s acquisition. Absent an explanation based on 
financial fundamentals, the best explanation of Airgas’s stock premium 
relative to Air Products’ stock price and multiple expansion is the 
expectation of a future transaction or activist shareholder intervention. In 
this case at least, the market was correct because Airgas ultimately sold to 
Air Liquide.  
The above stock price study of Airgas provides insight into the debate 
on short-termism. It suggests some limits of post-intervention stock price 
studies and cautions against over-reliance on conclusions drawn. Such 
empirical studies, of course, provide useful information and insights.207 
Data and empirical analyses provide another view of the cathederal, 
however limited or obstructed the view may be. At the same time, empirical 
studies are also inherently fraught with uncertainty, noise, and interpretive 
speculation, as the above analysis also exhibits.208 The stock price analysis 
suggests one such possibility: that post-intervention stock price may 
increase for a significant period of time due a premium attributable to the 
expectation of future transactions or interventions in light of the fact that the 
subject company was the target of activist shareholder intervention in the 
past.209  
IV. SHORT-TERMISM AND THE ROLE OF HEDGE FUNDS 
The intertemporal model and the Airgas case study in Section III show 
that a short-term decision or financial perspective does not have an intrinsic 
normative quality. Like many matters in corporation law and corporate 
governance, the quality of an intertemporal choice is contextual; the 
outcome depends on a number of variables. This section explores these 
questions: When is short-termism benign, beneficial, or harmful? What is 




                                                                                                               
207. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8. 
208. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  
209. See Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 588 (citing empirical studies suggesting that changes in 












A. Benign and Beneficial Short-Termism 
We start with a benign form of short-termism, which is the inflation no 
loss form. Corporate action inflates stock price in the short-term, but does 
not affect either short-term or long-term profit. How this can be done is 
irrelevant. Perhaps managers raise market expectations, but fail to deliver 
on the hype. Or perhaps the mere presence of activists alone is sufficient 
speculation to increase stock price without any basis in fundamental 
value. 210  If there is no fraud or illegality or even trust-diminishing 
behavior—important caveats—inflation no loss form cannot be a problem. 
When price eventually falls to reflect the unaffected fundamental value, 
stockholders are not injured. This does not mean that individual 
shareholders do not suffer loss; rather, the disappointment in expectation is 
not in itself a cognizable harm. With respect to traders in the short-term 
inflationary period, do we care whether some lose while others win when 
intrinsic firm value has not been harmed? Stated differently, in what way is 
such stock price movement different from any other “noise” incorporated 
into the stock price? Where there has been no fraud or illegality, there is no 
social cost, only short-term winners and losers in zero sum trading.  
Benign short-termism can also occur in two other forms of short-termism. 
In the inflation loss form, managers inflate short-term stock price while 
compromising long-term profit that ultimately diminish firm value; and in 
the tradeoff form, managers make intertemporal choices of profits, but can 
make bad tradeoffs that ultimately diminish firm value. In both situations, 
harm may be done at the micro-level of individual firms, but there is no real 
social harm at the system level as long as aggregate decisions are random.211 
In a complex market, we expect random errors in many facets of decision-
making.  
The tradeoff form can also result in beneficial short-termism, actions that 
increase firm value.212 The intertemporal model sheds light on firms that 
may be best served by operating under a short-term framework. Riskier 
firms with higher cost of capital would generally be better served by 
focusing on the short-term.213 The logic of this proposition is inherent in the 
                                                                                                               
210. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 1122 (“[T]he average abnormal returns observed 
during the twenty-day period before and after an investor files a Schedule 13D are approximately 6%, a 
magnitude consistent with the findings in prior work.”).  
211. See Roe, supra note 8, at 979–80 (arguing that “one must evaluate the American economy 
from a system-wide perspective”).  
212. See supra Section II.  
213. See supra Section II.C.  
 










process of discounting cashflow. Concretely, we can think about two 
situations.  
Consider first a leveraged buyout (LBO). LBOs are risky transactions.214 
The firm, of course, must have a long-term strategy because investors seek 
a profitable exit. But the substantial strategic focus must be on the short-
term. The firm must increase operating profit and cashflow to service the 
leverage.215 There is no tomorrow unless the now is viable, and all efforts 
must be geared toward that end. Short-term profits and financial results are 
required for survival, and survival is success in many of these transactions.  
Consider next an industry that is characterized by high dynamism or 
susceptibility to competitive disruptions. The technology industry fits this 
bill. In certain segments of the industry, strategic planning for a long-term 
period may not make sense. 216  Assets, such as intellectual property in 
information technology, may have shorter lifecycles irrespective of legal 
protections. Managers may not be able to project technology and market 
trends in the long-term. These companies may need to focus on short-term 
trends, profits and results. Their “long-term” strategy may simply be a 
tautology—nothing more than a commitment to being a going concern. For 
example, a long-term commitment to R&D is a commitment to continue to 
do R&D in each continuous short-term period that is required for short-term 
results. In these examples, the short-term strategy is rational, and the long-
term strategy can best be described as a commitment to be excellent in each 
successive short-term period constituting in total the long-term life of the 
firm.  
Conversely, some firms would be better served by a long-term focus. 
Less risky companies with lower cost of capital217 or industries with durable 
business models or long-lived assets would be better served by focusing on 
the long-term. Such industries include banking and finance. The business of 
commercial banking as depository institutions and traditional investment 
banking218 as capital markets intermediaries are durable functions with high 
social utility. The financial industry should be managed with a long-term 
                                                                                                               
214. Frank H. Easterbrook, High-Yield Debt as an Incentive Device, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
183, 191 (1991).  
215. See RHEE, supra note 73, at 185–88 (explaining the constraints in an LBO transaction); John 
H. Ginsberg et al., Befuddlement Betwixt Two Fulcrums: Calibrating the Scales of Justice to Ascertain 
Fraudulent Transfers in Leveraged Buyouts, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 71, 75 (2011) (present debt 
service in an LBO “is an inflexible demand on the target’s cash-flow”).  
216. See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Vertical Mergers and Entrepreneurial Exit, 70 FLA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3217095.  
217. See supra Section II.C.  
218. “Traditional” investment banking refers to core investment banking activities such as 
securities underwriting, M&A advisory, asset management, and broker-dealer services in the pursuit of 













view where sacrifice of short-term profit for long-term sustainability would 
be better.219 Another example is biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, which 
depend on long-term investments in R&D to procure a pipeline of products 
that are long-lived assets.220  Biotechnology and drugs may have longer 
lifecycles than information technology. The energy industry may be subject 
to a similar analysis.  
We should also consider the possibility that, in spite of exhortations from 
some academics and judges, a broad segment of shareholders may prefer 
short-term profit and return over longer-term risk and investment.221 This 
preference may reflect views that perhaps managements have an innate 
tendency towards empire-building and inefficient investment of assets,222 or 
that perhaps the dynamism of the macroeconomy and the corporate 
landscape merits greater emphasis on short-term returns over long-term 
expectation from specific investments. 223  Rather than causing short-
termism, as some claim, hedge funds may simply be the “spearhead” in a 
broader movement by skeptical shareholders who prefer more finite short-
term cash returns rather than longer-term expectation of returns.224 To the 
extent that short-termism reflects a broader shareholder preference, a 
presumption of benign short-termism should attach unless it can be shown 
that the aggregate of independent preferences in the capital market is 
inefficient.  
This preference may reflect a reality of the marketplace. Despite the 
default presumption of perpetual corporate life in corporation law,225 most 
corporations on average live only a fraction of the average life of natural 
persons. Various studies have shown that the implied survival rate of large 
public companies is measured in a few decades only.226 While some firms 
                                                                                                               
219. See Robert J. Rhee, The Decline of Investment Banking: Preliminary Thoughts on the 
Evolution of the Industry 1996−2008, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 75 (2010) (showing that investment banks 
took excessive risk by maintaining highly leveraged balance sheets to increase short-term profit).  
220. See Bill George, Another View: Can Biotech Survive Icahn?, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 
3, 2010) https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/another-view-can-biotech-survive-icahn (arguing 
that biotechnology companies require “enormous investments and extended time frames are required to 
create long-term shareholder value”). Cf. Roe, supra note 8, at 994 (citing studies showing a positive 
correlation between R&D investment and institution share ownership and greater entrenchment with 
lower R&D investment).  
221. Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 580.  
222. Id. Executives may have an incentive to create bigger companies because pay is highly 
correlated with the size of the corporation.  
223. This concept fits within the DCF framework. A greater uncertainty of the long-term means a 
higher discount rate, resulting in greater discounting of long-term cashflow. See supra Section II.  
224. Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, at 580.  
225. Supra note 79.  
226. See MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN, DAN CALLAHAN & DARIUS MAJD, CREDIT SUISSE, 
CORPORATE LONGEVITY: INDEX TURNOVER AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 2 exhibit 1 (2017) (noting 
 










“die” from liquidation and failure, most firms cease to exist through mergers 
and acquisitions.227 Companies like the Ford Motor Co. are the exception,228 
and Airgas, which survived for thirty years before being acquired, the 
unremarkable example. 229  We infer two observations from this market 
reality. The first is that macroeconomic developments driving innovation 
and M&A activity may be largely unaffected by particular legal reforms 
enacted to combat a perceived problem of short-termism. The second is that 
in light of the average life and half-life of firms, shareholders may believe 
that any given short-term period constitutes the firm’s end of life. Such 
reasonable belief, based on probabilistic thinking, would incentivize 
shareholders to emphasize the importance of the short-term.  
The selection of time horizon and strategic management are not a one-
size-fits-all proposition across industries and companies. Broad, abstract, 
and ambiguous discussions of short-termism as a didactic exercise are 
unhelpful. Certain industries and circumstances may be more optimally 
managed on the whole with shorter or longer time horizons than other 
industries. Even then, the choice of intertemporal strategy at the micro-level 
of specific managerial decisions is always an economic cost-benefit analysis 
of relative opportunities and their relation to firm value. 230  In many 
instances, the short-term view is benign or beneficial. Short-termism surely 
exists randomly. In exercising business judgment, managers routinely make 
wrong strategic choices in the selection of time horizon. The question is not 
whether wrong decisions are sometimes made; of course they are. Any 
claim of mismanagement—intentional, negligent, or innocent—would be 
subject to existing redress available in corporation law and corporate 
governance such as derivative suits, shareholder exit, shareholder activism, 
and, more unlikely, challenge to corporate control.231 Otherwise, random 
                                                                                                               
that the implied survival rate of S&P 500 and Fortune 500 firms range from sixteen to twenty-four years, 
and the typical half-life of public companies is about ten years); Madeleine I.G. Daepp et al., The 
Mortality of Companies, 12 J. ROYAL SOC. INTERFACE 1 (2015) (finding that the typical half-life of 
public companies is about a decade regardless of business sectors).  
227. See Daepp et al., supra note 226, at 1 (“While liquidation is often responsible for firm deaths, 
a much more common cause of death relates to the disappearance of companies through mergers and 
acquisitions.”); MAUBOUSSIN, CALLAHAN & MAJD, supra note 226, at 6 (“[M]ore than half the removals 
are the result of M&A, while only one-third are from failure.”).  
228. Ford was incorporated in 1903, went public in 1956, and of course still exists today. See https: 
//corporate.ford.com/history.html. See also Daniel Roberts, The Oldest Companies of the Fortune 500, 
FORTUNE (June 10, 2015) http://fortune.com/2015/06/10/oldest-companies-fortune-500 (providing 
other examples of long-existing companies).  
229. Airgas was created as a public company in 1986 and it survived until 2016 when Air Liquide 
acquired it. WANG, HEALY, ROSSANO & THOMAS, supra note 117, at 2; supra note 158.  
230. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 802 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“The essence of 
rational choice is an assessment of costs and benefits and the consideration of alternatives.”).  













errors in the selection of time horizon distributed across the market are not 
distinguishable from random instances of bad management. They are 
subject to traditional deference to managerial decisions and thus fall within 
the realm of business judgment.232 No other policy response is necessary.233 
B. Harmful Short-Termism 
Short-termism is a social problem if it is systemic.234 Systemic short-
termism is possible only when two conditions coexist. First, aggregate 
managerial decisions are biased toward short-termism in the corporate 
market. Managers systemically inflate short-term stock price at the expense 
of long-term profit or make bad intertemporal tradeoffs. If that is the 
hypothesis, we should identify the precise mechanism by which business 
decisions are systemically biased. But this is only the first part of showing 
the hypothesis to be true. Second, the capital market is also inefficient. 
Otherwise, if systemic biased managerial actions are evident in public 
information, an efficient capital market would preclude the possibility of 
short-termism. Shareholders, seeking the highest risk-adjusted returns, 
would know that stock prices are inflated; knowing this they would sell 
shares in the short-term before the stock declines at some point in the future 
in response to the firm’s diminished long-term prospect; but doing so would 
reduce the current stock price.235 For systemic short-termism to manifest, 
the mechanisms of managerial decision-making and efficient capital 
markets must somehow fail together.   
                                                                                                               
232. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016) (providing that the board shall manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2003) (same); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (articulating the business judgment rule); In re Caremark Int’l 
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (same).  
233. See supra note 27.  
234. See supra note 211.  
235. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1802 
(2006) (“If a governance provision does not serve long-term shareholder value, its adoption will likely 
reduce short-term prices (which reflect expectations about long-term value) . . . .”); Kahan & Rock, 
supra note 7, at 1084 (explaining that in an efficient market “interests of investors with short-term 
trading horizons will not conflict with those of investors with long-term trading horizons”); Jonathan R. 
Macey, State Anti-Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 467, 481 (1988) 
(“The point, of course, is that the distinction between maximizing firm value for the present versus 
maximizing firm value for the future is wholly false. What matters in determining the value of a firm’s 
shares is the present value of all flows—present and future.”); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, 
Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 532–33 
(2002) (arguing that the distinction between long-term and short-term investors is nonsensical because 
“[u]nder elementary principles of finance, even short-term investors have an incentive to maximize the 
firm’s long-term value”). See also supra notes 23, 65.  
 










Proponents of the hypothesis have argued that the two conditions of 
inefficiency can coexist. Pressure from short-term focused shareholders is 
the mechanism that induces systematic errors in corporate decision-making. 
Stock prices are inflated on a short-term basis through some sort of 
accounting or financial gimmickry or deception, having no relation to actual 
value creation. Systemic inflation of short-term stock price unjustified by 
fundamentals is possible, they have argued, because markets are inefficient 
and do not perfectly incorporate all information.236  
Can systemic inefficiencies in the corporate and capital markets coexist? 
They can, but it is a special condition, one that does not occur routinely. A 
systemic increase in stock prices unjustified by fundamental value is the 
definition of an asset bubble.237 The short-termism hypothesis is, then, an 
argument that shareholder-induced short-termism is a form of a stock 
market bubble based on systemic failure of corporate governance.238 The 
unjustified stock price increase across the market may be pronounced or 
mild, but short-termism is a social problem only if it is an asset bubble.  
Bubbles in business history are not unique, 239  but the argument that 
short-termism creates a bubble is a difficult one. The nature of corporate 
strategy must somehow decouple stock price from fundamental value. The 
markets must misperceive value in some fundamental way in a liquid, 
informationally rich stock market. This can happen. The last two instances 
of asset bubbles involved complex asset classes: business models based on 
the revolutionary technology called the internet seen in the late 1990s and 
structured finance and derivative instruments tied to residential mortgages 
seen in the late 2000s. The narrative of short-termism tells a story that 
activist shareholders pursue a menu of strategies, including changes in 
policies on dividends and stock buybacks, divestitures, asset allocation, 
corporate leadership, M&A, and R&D.240 These strategies are not arcane or 
                                                                                                               
236. See Strine, supra note 34, at 464–65; Dallas & Barry, supra note 63, at 546; William W. 
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 
691–94 (2010); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 659–60 (1991); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 198. Cf. MARK J. 
ROE, STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 
13 (1994) (noting that the arguments explaining short-termism “are highly speculative, cut against the 
usual belief that American securities markets are informationally efficient, and so far lack strong 
empirical backup” but that “there is just enough suspicion in the business world that securities markets 
induce short-term behavior”). 
237. Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market Approach to 
Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 990 (2007).  
238. See Strine, supra note 34, at 462–67 (discussing the long-term and short-term debate in the 
context of efficient markets and stock market bubbles).  
239. See, e.g., MALCOLM BALEN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE: THE 
WORLD’S FIRST GREAT FINANCIAL SCANDAL (2003).  













complex. They are plain vanilla. They have long been the subjects of 
academic study and routine aspects of business strategy and consideration.  
The argument for the short-termism bubble is distinguishable in other 
ways. In the most recent examples of bubbles in the securities markets, 
bubbles occurred in specific industry sectors or products: for example, the 
internet or residential mortgages.241 Most proponents of the short-termism 
hypothesis assume that the markets have systemically misvalued stocks 
broadly, across different firms, industries, and strategic choices. Scholars 
do not explicitly state this assumption, but most commentaries do not limit 
the scope of the hypothesis to a localized market segment or a specific firm 
profile. Lastly, the hypothesis of short-termism is based on the argument 
that short-termism inflates stock prices in the short-term, but some empirical 
evidence contradicts the notion that stock prices systematically declined 
after the short-term intervention.242 If there is a bubble, there is no evidence 
that a market correction or a crash has occurred as of yet.  
Despite skepticism of the bubble theory expressed above, this article 
does not reject that possibility. Even opponents must acknowledge that only 
in the past thirty years, we have had three major market crashes, at least two 
market bubbles, and systemic crises in the honesty of financial accounting 
and the soundness of financial engineering.243 Were markets efficient in 
1987, 1996–2000, and 2006–2008? Those empirical experiences caution 
against hubris of theory and the unskeptical belief in market prices at any 
given moment. Market mishaps, among other reasons, have spurred the idea 
that short-termism has been a cause. Commentators have argued that short-
termism was a causal factor in two prominent instances of market bubbles 
and crashes and that the market did not sufficiently incorporate the negative 
effects of short-termism into stock prices: the accounting scandals of the 
late 1990s that resulted in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,244 and the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009 that resulted in the passage of the Dodd-Frank 
                                                                                                               
241. See KOLLER, DOBBS & HUYETT, supra note 88, at 99 (“Sector and company bubbles are more 
frequent than marketwide bubbles, but they’re still rare.”). 
242. See Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 8, at 1089–91. 
243. Major market crashes are Black Monday of October 1987, the internet dot com crash of 2000, 
and the crash precipitated by the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Market bubbles include the internet 
bubble of the late 1990s and the housing bubble in the late 2000s. In the late 1990s, accounting scandals 
were endemic, resulting in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In the late 2000s, abuses of financial 
engineering in structured finance and derivatives were endemic, resulting in the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act.  
244. See, e.g., ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 237 (2013); 
William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1359 (2002).  
 










Act. 245  Yet, the argument that short-termism principally explains these 
complex events would be too simplistic.246  
If systemic short-termism exists, what should be the policy response? 
Reform in corporation law is one answer. But this prescription is sound only 
if short-termism is systemic across all corporations and industries. If 
corporate governance is the common problem, corporation law is the 
common thread. Some scholars have assumed this scenario, prompting them 
to propose broadly applicable prescriptions founded in corporation law247 
or regulation of capital markets.248  
Systemic short-termism and market failure may exist in a localized 
segment of the market. This situation requires a different policy response. 
Examples are easy to conjure. Suppose the energy sector may be afflicted 
with short-termism. Companies choose short-term profit by focusing on 
fossil fuel and forego long-term profitability by failing to develop 
alternative energy products. If systemic short-termism is localized to an 
industry sector or a particular firm profile, the policy response would not lie 
in corporation law. It would most likely be legislation in the particular sector 
or profile afflicted with the inefficient short-termism. For example, a 
shortfall in R&D in a particular industry sector could be stimulated through 
changes in tax or accounting policies. Localized problems would most 
likely require substantive changes in the rules of the specific industry as 
opposed to universally applicable rules such as corporation law.  
                                                                                                               
245. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 22, at 268; Cremers, Masconale & Sepe, supra note 19, at 748.  
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COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011) 
(describing the complex causes of the financial crisis).  
247. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, 
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v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1384–85 (Del. 1996) (upholding charter provision granting superior voting 
rights for shareholders who held for three years or more); Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A. Nos. 9469–
VCP, 9497–VCP, 9508–VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (upholding a poison pill 
designed to thwart activist hedge funds using “wolf pack” tactics).  
248. See James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 4 E. ECON. J. 153, 155 
(1978) (proposing a transaction tax to curb speculative currency trading); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax 
Policy to Curb Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 101, 109 (1989) (same); Lawrence H. 
Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a 
Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261, 272 (1989) (same); LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, 
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The legislative responses to the accounting scandals of the late 1990s and 
the financial crisis of the late 2000s illustrate the different approaches 
toward problems caused, at least in part by short-termism. The accounting 
fraud problems were perceived to be endemic to the entire corporate market. 
WorldCom and Enron, the two poster children of the era, did business in 
different industry sectors, the telecommunications and the energy industries 
respectively. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act applied new rules across the entire 
corporate market. On the other hand, the epicenter of the financial crisis of 
2008–2009 was the broad financial sector, and the Dodd-Frank Act, albeit 
voluminous because the financial sector is enormous, principally focused 
on this industry.  
C. Liquidity of Concentrated Ownership  
Hedge funds have been the ire of critics of short-termism. Does the short-
term focus of hedge funds pose a systemic problem? Not at the moment, but 
not because the short-term focus is benign or beneficial in the aggregate. 
We do not know that hedge fund-induced short-termism, if it exists at all, is 
benign, beneficial or harmful in the aggregate. Empirical evidence seems to 
be inconclusive, and any positive statement that such short-termism is either 
good or bad seems to be based on educated guesses, intuitions, and 
anecdotes. Rather, hedge funds with a business model based on influencing 
corporate governance with a short-term horizon do not pose a problem 
because they do not currently have the scale to pose a systemic threat in the 
market. 
In 2016, the total assets managed by activist hedge funds was about $176 
billion. 249  Compare this figure to the total market capitalization of 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, which 
is $32 trillion.250 The total size of assets held by activist hedge funds is about 
the same size as the market capitalization of DowDuPont,251 and is less than 
the market capitalizations of many other large public companies.252 Based 
                                                                                                               
249. See Josh Black, The Activist Investing Annual Review 2017, HARV. LAW SCH. FORUM ON 
CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Feb. 21, 2017) ($194 billion in 2015). See also Coffee & Palia, supra note 8, 
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250. Jeff Desjardins, Here’s the Difference between NASDAQ and NYSE, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 
11, 2017).  
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capitalizations ($ billion): Citigroup $203, Boeing $200, Chevron $253, Cisco $202, Coca-Cola $196, 
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activist hedge funds ($ billion): Apple $1,632, Google $782, Berkshire Hathaway $518, Facebook $521, 
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on these recent figures, and assuming that all assets held by activist hedge 
funds are stock, hedge funds can hold about 0.6% of the capitalization of 
public companies in the two largest U.S. stock exchanges. Their influence 
is larger than this percentage would suggest, because they are not diversified 
investors but instead invest in concentrated minority stakes sufficient to 
exert influence on corporate governance. With their limited capital, they can 
still cover much of the market. However, they are a still tiny fraction of the 
ownership in public stock. Unless their assets under management grows 
substantially, activist hedge funds are unlikely to cause systemic 
macroeconomic market problems.253  
Their aggregate size explains aspects of their broad strategies. They do 
not generally sponsor takeovers. They may be merger arbitrageurs as seen 
in Airgas or may recommend to managers to pursue an M&A deal, but they 
do not generally takeover companies directly.254 Acquiring control require 
a large pool of capital, commitment to manage the firm after acquisition, 
and an investment return measured in possibly many years—none of which 
comports with hedge fund strategy. If there are minority shareholders 
remaining, a controlling shareholder must owe fiduciary duties.255 Rather, 
hedge funds take a minority equity stake sufficient to influence corporate 
governance through publicity campaigns or proxy contests256 They are in 
“the market for corporate influence.” 257  In this way, hedge funds are 
different from the traditional venture capital, private equity, and leverage 
buyout funds, whose business models may be centered on taking a 
significant stake with a longer-term time horizon.258  
                                                                                                               
253. A single hedge fund can cause a systemic crisis in the market, as we saw in the case of Long-
Term Capital Management (LTCM). See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2001). But LTMC was a hedge fund that used 
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258. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Poison Pill’s Relevance in the Age of Shareholder Activism, 
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John Armour, supra note 257, at 58–60 (distinguishing between the “market for control” with traditional 













In theory, the best utility of activist short-term shareholders is a form of 
a liquidity of concentrated ownership. The benefit of this function can be 
seen by comparing ownership structures in the U.S. and other parts of the 
world. Historically, public ownership of stock in the U.S. was characterized 
by diffuse and passive shareholders as described by Berle and Means.259 
The Berle-Means corporation was a product of past political choices in 
muting the power of institutional intermediaries.260 The classic account of 
managerial agency cost states that the consequences of a diffuse shareholder 
ownership structure were shareholder passivity and rational indifference, 
which increase agency cost.261 The U.S. ownership structure has historically 
differed from those of other parts of the world such as Japan and Germany, 
where concentrated shareholder ownership by financial institutions and 
other intermediaries is commonly seen.262 In these models, concentrated 
ownership with long-term investment horizon results in substantial 
shareholder influence on management. 263  With the rise of institutional 
shareholders in the U.S., the model of atomized shareholders no longer 
reflects current ownership structures of many U.S. public companies.264 
This trend of concentrated ownership and shareholder activism moves the 
needle on the balance of power between shareholders and managers.  
In this new environment, activist hedge funds can, in theory, play a niche 
role. Due to the short time horizons of hedge funds, their capital is highly 
mobile. 265  They provide concentrated ownership—a structure that more 
resembles the ownership structures in other countries where shareholders 
influence management, except that the concentrated ownership they provide 
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is temporary and transactional. 266  Their capital is mobile and their 
perspective is short-term. This liquidity of concentrated ownership provides 
an American twist on the idea of concentrated ownership seen in much of 
the rest of the world. Perhaps due in part to this transience, the lack of long-
term commitment, the newness of the relationship, and certainly due to the 
confrontational nature of proxy contests, the relationship between 
concentrated capital and incumbent management may be less cooperative 
and trustful and more adversarial in the American form.  
We see the liquidity of concentrated ownership in a common strategy. 
Since hedge funds lack aggregate size and desire to acquire corporate 
control, they sometimes combine forces, thus turning a small minority stake 
of one shareholder into something greater when other shareholders are 
joined. When an investment opportunity is spotted, independent hedge 
funds may join as a part of a loosely coordinated effort that must be careful 
not to skirt SEC rules on ownership reporting and short-swing profits. This 
tactic is called a “wolf pack,”267 and to some it is a pejorative connoting a 
predatory nature.268 But the metaphor may be an apt description of a useful 
role hedge funds can play in theory in the corporate landscape. It is well 
known that wolves hunt in teams and purposefully target the weakest, most 
vulnerable prey,269 and this natural behavior strengthens the prey species by 
weeding out weaker individuals.270 The wolf pack metaphor, it seems, fits 
the thesis that hedge funds can play a positive role in diminishing 
managerial agency cost.271 They prowl the corporate landscape in search of 
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WOLF 28 (1993); Kevin J. Madonna, The Wolf in North America: Defining International Ecosystems vs. 
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271. See Sharfman, supra note 11, at 822. See also Gilson & Gordon, supra note 13, at 896–902 













weak companies to target. 272  The idea that a loose pack of minority 
shareholders could coalesce in transitory transactions was anticipated many 
years before hedge fund activism became prominent.273 The reference to a 
mechanism of natural selection is a minor point that the descriptive of “wolf 
pack” is more than just a colorful pejorative. It substantively describes the 
theory of their potential utility.  
There is a more substantial analogy to a fundamental principle in ecology, 
one that both proponents and opponents of the short-termism hypothesis 
would agree in principle, if not in practice. Both predator and prey do best 
when there is homeostasis—a stable equilibrium between the two 
interdependent populations, each depending on the other to maintain a 
healthy balance in their populations. This idea is useful in the corporate 
market. The aggregate size of hedge funds precludes their ownership 
broadly across the entire U.S. equity markets; and not many, one presumes, 
may think it a good idea that such activism should take hold in the entire 
corporate market—is the U.S. corporate market that inefficient? With 
limited capital, hedge funds bring a liquidity of concentrated ownership to 
only those companies that may be the weakest or have the highest agency 
cost. In a well-functioning capital market, the amount of capital that hedge 
funds can deploy should be a function of the number and quality of profit 
opportunities in the market for corporate influence.  
Short-term shareholder activism may serve a useful function so long as 
the amount of liquid concentrated ownership is in homeostasis with the 
number of transient, transactional opportunities—a stable equilibrium 
between capital and opportunity. We would not want too many wolves on 
the prowl, so to speak; nor would we want no wolves at all in the ecosystem. 
Too much short-term capital chasing too few short-term profit opportunities 
would create systemic problems, and ultimately investors on both sides of 
the transaction would lose. Too little short-term capital chasing too many 
profit opportunities would result in opportunity cost and lower firm values, 
and ultimately the markets would be lesser for it. We do not know the level 
of transient capital required to achieve this balance. Nor can any empirical 
study conceivably measure this. The optimal amount of capital is ultimately 
a price-setting function of the capital markets in determining the supply-
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demand of this specific form of capital and its cost of capital. However, we 
know that given the size of the assets under management by activist hedge 
fund presently, this market is fairly small relative to the aggregate 
capitalization of U.S. public companies. This fact should give some comfort 
that any relative imbalances, either too much or too little capital, or relative 
efficacy of the theory of hedge fund utility in the actual practice of corporate 
governance, will not result in systemic problems at the current levels of 
capital.  
In summary, hedge funds are not yet sufficiently large in the market to 
engender an asset bubble based on systemically harmful corporate short-
termism. They are a player in the complex capital market where ultimately 
their utility will determine their size and cost. Activist hedge funds are not 
detrimental to the market in a systemic sense. Of course, they can randomly 
err or harm many companies in a large market, just the way they can 
randomly benefit companies. We can infer that if corporate short-termism 
is a social problem, hedge funds are not the cause of it because they do not 
yet have systemic scale. We can also infer that much of short-termism in the 
market today is either benign because it is random or does not affect intrinsic 
value, or beneficial because managers are making proper intertemporal 
choices.  
CONCLUSION 
Within the larger question of manager-shareholder power allocation is 
the question of whether short-termism and the role of short-term activists, 
such as hedge funds, have social utility. The question is robustly debated on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. The answer will ultimately hinge on clear 
empirical evidence or, absent a consensus, the truth of time. Scholars 
sharply disagree on theory, and empirical evidence is thus far inconclusive. 
We are not at the point of a consensus. In the context of this important 
ongoing debate, this article shows that the issue of short-termism cannot be 
painted in broad didactic brushstrokes. A short time horizon is not per se 
socially inefficient. Short-term choices and bias can be rational. The optimal 
strategy is often a tradeoff taking into account cost of capital, opportunity 
gains and costs, and time horizon. The effects of short-term decisions are 
not randomly or evenly distributed; specific companies, industries, or 
market segments may benefit more from short-termism or may be more 
susceptible to its costs. The intertemporal model of short-termism proves 
the intuition that if profitable enough, a short-term perspective can be the 
value maximizing strategy.  
Because short-term actions in the abstract do not have a normative, 












term choice is benign, beneficial, or harmful. Benign or beneficial short-
termism occurs when fundamental firm value is unaffected, when errors are 
random, or when short-term choice is rational. Short-termism is harmful at 
the systemic level only under the specific conditions that both the corporate 
market and stock market are inefficient. Short-termism is a social problem 
only when it creates a bubble. With these ideas in mind, short-term 
shareholders can perform an important function in theory, though it remains 
an open question whether they do so in fact. Transient, transactional capital 
can provide a liquidity of concentrated ownership, bringing to bear a limited 
supply of concentrated ownership for the purpose of actively influencing 
governance. As long as the supply of capital is limited relative to the market 
size or is rationally related to the market need for intervention, the risk of a 
systemic adverse bias in short-term decision-making is mitigated.   
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